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“Today, there is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of
mass destruction . . . .”
– President Barack Obama (2010)
INTRODUCTION
What is the role that consequence should play in a Fourth Amendment analysis?
Should our view of reasonableness be affected by the nature of the consequence
that the government seeks to prevent, such as stopping a terrorist from using a
weapon of mass destruction (WMD)? While some may consider the use of a WMD
by a terrorist to be a plot for an action movie, since the September 11, 2001,
attacks, there have been increasing indications that malicious actors or
organizations are attempting to obtain a WMD in order to cause massive
devastation or catastrophic loss of life.1 Clearly, this risk did not exist at the time
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1. See ROLF MOWATT-LARSSEN, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL BELFER CENTER FOR
SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AL QAEDA WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
THREAT: HYPE OR REALITY? 5–6 (2012), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu
/files/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf (discussing “Al Qaeda’s patient, decade-long effort to steal or
construct an improvised nuclear device” and its “perception of the benefits of producing the
image of a mushroom cloud rising over a U.S. city, just as the 9/11 attacks have altered the
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the Constitution was adopted.2 Indeed, one expert has warned that at “no time in
human history has there been the ability for a cabal of hateful fanatics, unfettered
from the constraints of a state, to destroy cities or kill hundreds of thousands in a
single cataclysmic act.”3
Aside from advancements in technology that may enable the government to
deploy a comprehensive system of WMD sensors in the future,4 one of the most
effective methods that the government could employ to locate a suspected terrorist
who intended to use a WMD in an American city would be to monitor the
terrorist’s communications. There are two different statutory regimes that regulate
the government’s ability to obtain the content of communications in the United
States—the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)5 and Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III).6 To be sure, if
the government is able to establish probable cause with respect to a particular
telephone or e-mail account that is being used by a terrorist (and is able to meet the
other requirements of FISA or Title III), then the government can obtain a lawful
wiretap7 to monitor the content8 of the communications. Indeed, it is well settled
course of history”); Federal Bureau of Investigation, Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/wmd/wmd
_faqs (noting that there are indicators of increasing WMD threats since the 9/11 attacks); see
also STEVE BOWMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31332, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION:
THE TERRORIST THREAT (2002) (“The continuing possibility of terrorist attacks using nuclear,
biological, or chemical weapons is an ongoing concern in the national security policy arena in
the face of a clear trend among terrorists to inflict greater numbers of casualties.”).
2. While cannons pulled by horses or loaded on ships may have posed the greatest threat
to colonists, some historians have found circumstantial evidence that British troops sought to
use naturally occurring incidents of small pox as biological weapons during the colonial period
both prior to and during the American Revolution. See Elizabeth A. Fenn, Biological Warfare
in Eighteenth-Century North America: Beyond Jeffery Amherst, 86 J. AM. HIST. 1522, 156570
(2000); Harold B. Gill, Jr., Colonial Germ Warfare, COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG J. (Spring
2004), http://www.history.org/Foundation/journal/Spring04/warfare.cfm.
3. See Nuclear Terrorism: Assessing the Threat to the Homeland: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. 405 (2008) [hereinafter
Nuclear Terrorism Hearing] (statement of Gary Anthony Ackerman, Research Director, National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland).
4. See U.S. Researchers Unveil New WMD Sensors, GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE
(Apr. 3, 2006), http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-researchers-unveil-new-wmd-sensors (“The
Argonne National Laboratory in Illinois has developed new sensors for remote detection of
WMD materials . . . .”). The application of the Fourth Amendment to the use of such sensors
in public or private spaces is beyond the scope of this Article. Cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (discussing the use of a device that “explore[s] details of the home that
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion”).
5. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811 (2012).
6. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (2012).
7. This Article uses the term “wiretap” to generically describe the monitoring, interception,
or recording of the contents of telephone or e-mail communications in circumstances in which a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. However, it should be noted that “electronic
surveillance” is a term of art that is specifically defined in FISA. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (2012).
Whether specific forms of monitoring, interception, or recording constitute electronic
surveillance within the meaning of FISA is beyond the scope of this Article.
8. Other tools in FISA and Title 18 permit the government to obtain noncontent
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that where the government has individualized suspicion in regard to a particular
communication device and meets the statutory requirements of FISA or Title III,
court-authorized wiretaps are constitutional.9
However, let us assume that a reliable informant, who has an established track
record and inside access to a terrorist group, reports that a highly skilled member of
that terrorist group has entered the United States and intends to assemble a WMD
in a major metropolitan city on the East Coast sometime within the next thirty to
forty-five days. To add additional context, let us further assume that the informant
is 80 percent certain that the terrorist is assembling the WMD in a safe house
somewhere in Georgetown, a historic neighborhood located approximately two
miles from the White House. If the informant does not know the precise location or
the specific telephone or e-mail account that the terrorist is using to communicate
with other coconspirators, how should a federal court resolve the constitutional
tension that would arise if the government sought an order permitting it to target an
indeterminate number of communication devices? If the nation was not at war,10
would a federal court under the circumstances of this hypothetical be faced with
what some may call the Fourth Amendment’s “no-win” scenario? Would the court
face the choice of either issuing an unconstitutional order that allows the
government to wiretap every communication device being used in Georgetown
(because that is the only way to find the terrorist and prevent the use of the WMD)
or refusing to issue the order because the Fourth Amendment11 tolerates no other
result, which could lead to massive destruction or catastrophic loss of life?
The WMD scenario enables us to explore what may very well be some of the
most challenging constitutional questions of our time. First, should consequence—
that is, the nature and gravity of harm the government seeks to prevent—ever play
an outcome-determinative role in a Fourth Amendment analysis? Equally
important: who should decide whether consequence has a role to play? And finally,
how can government officials, who are responsible for protecting the nation from
terrorists seeking to cause a catastrophic consequence, obtain greater ex ante
certainty in regard to the constitutionality of their preventative actions?
information, such as dialing, signaling, routing, and addressing information (DRAS) as well
as other basic and transactional subscriber information. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 27012709
(2012); 18 U.S.C. §§ 31213127 (2012); 50 U.S.C. §§ 18411846, 1861 (2012). This
Article focuses on issues relating to the government’s ability to obtain the content of
communications.
9. Although the Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the constitutionality of
FISA or Title III, lower federal courts have rejected all facial challenges to these statutes.
E.g., In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (holding FISA
constitutional); United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 982 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding Title III
constitutional and citing widespread agreement across the circuits on its constitutionality).
10. Issues relating to the use of wiretaps during a time of war are beyond the scope of
this Article. FISA, however, does authorize the “President, through the Attorney General . . .
to acquire foreign intelligence information for a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days
following a declaration of war by the Congress.” 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2012).
11. The Fourth Amendment reads: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
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While the Supreme Court has relaxed Fourth Amendment requirements in the
context of searches designed to serve “special needs,”12 the underlying rationale for
upholding these searches is that diminished expectations of privacy exist in certain
circumstances and, when weighed against governmental interests that transcend
ordinary law enforcement needs, the government’s interests outweigh those
diminished expectations of privacy.13 In some special needs cases, the federal
courts have therefore concluded that the Fourth Amendment will tolerate
suspicionless and even warrantless searches.14 In the hypothetical, however, we can
stipulate that individual expectations of privacy with respect to the content of the wire
or electronic communications15 that would be intercepted would be at their zenith.
Moreover, the emergency exceptions carved out by the Supreme Court require an
immediacy not necessarily present in our hypothetical.16 The central and fundamental
issue is, therefore, whether consequence matters from a constitutional perspective.
The Supreme Court has yet to face a Fourth Amendment case involving the
potential for massive destruction or catastrophic loss of life from the threatened use
of a WMD. While the Court stated in dicta more than a decade ago that the “Fourth
Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set
up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack,”17 it has rejected a special crime-scene
exception to the Fourth Amendment when a murder has taken place.18 Additionally,
it has recently stated, in a case involving Global Positioning System (GPS)

12. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 31314 (1997) (stating that particularized
exceptions to the individualized suspicion requirement are sometimes warranted when
special needs concerns other than crime detection are at issue).
13. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (“When faced with special law
enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the
Court has found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless
search or seizure reasonable.”); Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why Public Safety is
Not a Special Need, 59 DUKE L.J. 843, 890 (2010) (“For some of these searches, the
Supreme Court has stressed that the nature of the intrusion is very slight and that the subject
has a reduced expectation of privacy . . . .”).
14. See infra notes 8596 and accompanying text.
15. Under Title III a “wire communication” is defined as “any aural transfer made in
whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by aid
of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception
(including the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any
person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or
foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce.”
18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2012). Title III defines an “electronic communication” as “any transfer
of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in
whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system
that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include [a wire communication].”
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012).
16. See infra notes 69–84 and accompanying text.
17. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (emphasis added) (citing
Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 66263 (7th Cir. 1999)).
18. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978) (rejecting a “murder-scene” exception
to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement despite the severity of the crime); see also
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511 (1978) (finding that the seriousness of the crime does
not create an exigency justifying a search without a warrant).
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monitoring, that there is “no precedent for the proposition that whether a search has
occurred depends on the nature of the crime being investigated.”19 On the other
hand, in that same case, five Justices agreed with the proposition that “longer-term
GPS monitoring . . . of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy,”20 and
four Justices stated that the Court did not need to consider whether prolonged GPS
monitoring in the context of investigations of “ extraordinary offenses would
similarly intrude on a constitutionally protected sphere of privacy.”21 This suggests
that a majority of the Court might conclude that consequence should play an
important role in a Fourth Amendment calculus. Waiting for such a case to reach
the Court,22 however, is arguably not in the best interests of the nation, particularly
if solving the no-win scenario requires policy choices more appropriately made by
elected officials than by judges.23
The purpose of this Article is to look at consequence, with a particular focus on
the threatened use of a WMD, and begin a discussion on a new doctrinal solution to
the hypothetical.24 As background, Part I takes a look at cardinal Fourth

19. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012).
20. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring, with whom Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, J. joined)
(emphasis added); see id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I agree with Justice ALITO
that, at the very least, ‘longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses
impinges on expectations of privacy.’” (emphasis added)).
21. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
22. See Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment
Unreasonableness in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 329, 417 (2002)
(“It seems inevitable that the Court will be presented with one or more cases in which the
police request additional investigative authority to deal with terrorism or other threats of
catastrophic harm.”). Recently, the Supreme Court touched on this issue when it considered
a Fourth Amendment case involving a driver who had been stopped for expired registration
tags. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). After the driver’s car was impounded, an
inventory search revealed two handguns under the car hood. Id. at 2480. At the scene, and
later at the police station, the police conducted a search of his cellular telephone without a
warrant, and found text messages and other evidence of gang-related activity. Id. Although
the Court’s decision was limited to the question of “how the search incident to arrest
doctrine applies to modern cell phones,” id. at 2484, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy had the
following exchange with California Solicitor General Edward Dumont during oral argument.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: It seems to me that in order to try to give some answer
to [these] concerns that maybe the distinction ought to be between serious and
nonserious offenses—offenses. I don't think that exists in our jurisprudence.
Correct me if I'm wrong.
MR. DUMONT: I think that's correct. The Court has previously declined to
draw that line.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (No. 13-132)
(emphasis added).
23. See infra notes 297316 and accompanying text.
24. This Article focuses on a subset of a related and broader issue that other scholars
have explored—namely, whether “crime-severity” distinctions should affect different Fourth
Amendment outcomes. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107
HARV. L. REV. 757, 802 (1994); Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth
Amendment: Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1, 9
(2011); Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment

6

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 90:1

Amendment principles and rules, as well as the many exceptions to the warrant,
probable cause, and particularity requirements that the Supreme Court has
recognized, and analyzes their potential applicability to the hypothetical. Part I also
seeks to draw the important distinction between reasonable expectations of privacy,
the analytical framework that governs whether certain government activities
constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement, which necessitates a weighing of
competing constitutional interests. Most significantly, Part I discusses minimization,
a well-established privacy-enhancing mechanism that normally serves as a back-end
check on the government’s conduct, to determine whether it can serve as a front-end
substitute for the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.
Part II briefly explores the differences between chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear WMDs, as well as the different consequences that can
reasonably be anticipated from their respective use.25 Identifying those differences
is critical to understanding how the significant definitional issues identified in Part
III might affect the implementation of any new doctrinal solution. Part IV then
looks at these issues through what I have elsewhere described as the “Fourth
Amendment’s protective lens,”26 and proposes that we use a probability
consequence matrix as an analytical framework to solve the no-win scenario.
Finally, Part V seeks to lay out a path forward so that Congress can consider and
enact sensible legislation that will enable us to identify the limited circumstances in
which consequence should be considered a factor in a Fourth Amendment calculus,
particularly when a terrorist threatens to use a WMD.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Principles and Rules
The Fourth Amendment is a “compound sentence consisting of two related
clauses.”27 The first clause provides that the “right of the people to be secure in
“Reasonableness,” 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1660 (1998); Frase, supra note 22, at 420;
Ronald M. Gould & Simon Stern, Catastrophic Threats and the Fourth Amendment, 77 S.
CAL. L. REV. 777, 81923 (2004); John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1037 (1974); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Toward a Better Categorical
Balance of the Costs and Benefits of the Exclusionary Rule, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 201, 241,
246 (2005); Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49,
53, 74 (1981); William A. Schroeder, Factoring the Seriousness of the Offense into Fourth
Amendment Equations—Warrantless Entries into Premises: The Legacy of Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 439, 52829 (1990); Simmons, supra note 13, at 895;
William J. Stuntz, Commentary, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 875 (2001).
25. Part II is based upon unclassified sources of information that are available to the
general public.
26. Scott J. Glick, Virtual Checkpoints and Cyber-Terry Stops: Digital Scans to Protect
the Nation’s Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources, 6 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 97,
125 (2012) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment’s “protective lens” strongly supports the
existence of a limited “cybersecurity exception”).
27. Morgan Cloud, Review, Searching Through History; Searching for History, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1721 (1996); see also Owen Fiss, Even in a Time of Terror, 31 YALE L. &
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their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated.”28 The second, commonly referred to as the “warrant
clause,”29 provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.”30
A “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment takes place whenever
the government intrudes upon “an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to
consider reasonable.”31 This formulation, which flows from Justice John Marshall
Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz v. United States,32 breaks down into a “twopart inquiry: first, has the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy
in the object of the challenged search? Second, is society willing to recognize that
expectation as reasonable?”33 If the government's conduct violates a person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy, or involves a trespass or physical intrusion upon
a constitutionally protected area, then the courts will consider the government’s
conduct to be a search.34 By way of comparison, a “seizure” within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment only takes place when there has been a “meaningful
interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property,”35 or when
there has been a “governmental termination of freedom of movement through
means intentionally applied.”36 Thus, the threshold question in any Fourth
Amendment calculus is whether a search or seizure has occurred.37 Only after that
determination has been made do we turn to the question of whether that search or
seizure is reasonable.
Notwithstanding the fact that many scholars have criticized the Supreme Court
for its lack of clarity and consistency in its treatment of the Fourth Amendment,38 a
POL’Y REV. 1, 25 (2012) (“The Fourth Amendment has an unusual grammatical
structure…[that] consists of two clauses.”).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
29. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 3.1(a), at 3–4 (5th ed. 2012) (noting that this clause is “customarily referred
to as the warrant clause”).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
32. 389 U.S. 347, 360–62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See generally 1 LAFAVE,
supra note 29, at 576–93.
33. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 740 (1979)).
34. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012) (holding that placing a GPS
tracking device on a vehicle for the purpose of obtaining information constitutes a trespass
and therefore a search in a constitutionally protected area, and stating that “[s]ituations
involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass . . . remain subject to
Katz analysis” (emphasis omitted)); see also Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983)
(stating that “[t]he Fourth Amendment protects legitimate expectations of privacy rather than
simply places”).
35. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
36. Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (emphasis omitted).
37. See generally Scott J. Glick, Note, Reexamining Fourth Amendment Seizures: A
New Starting Point, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 211 (1980) (discussing an analytical framework for
determining whether a seizure has occurred).
38. E.g., Amar, supra note 24, at 757 (“The Fourth Amendment today is an
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half century of jurisprudence has yielded a number of fundamental principles and
rules. First, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, the Fourth Amendment has
a “strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.”39 Although the
text itself does not delineate when precisely a warrant must be obtained,40 the
Supreme Court has concluded that all warrantless searches are “per se
unreasonable” subject only to “established and well-delineated exceptions.”41
Accordingly, unless such an exception applies, the government must obtain a court
order from a “neutral and detached” magistrate authorizing the search.42
A search warrant cannot be lawfully issued by a court unless it is supported by
“Oath or affirmation” that establishes probable cause to believe that a crime has
been committed and that evidence of the crime is located in the place to be
searched.43 Moreover, search warrants must “particularly” describe the place to be
searched and the items to be seized.44 Notably, “the Fourth Amendment does not
elaborate on the meaning of probable cause.”45 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has
emphasized that the probable cause standard is a “practical, nontechnical
conception”46—a “fluid concept . . . not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat
set of legal rules,”47 that requires courts to take into account competing interests.48
The Constitution’s text does not define the quantum of proof that would satisfy
the probable cause standard.49 While it is clear that a court cannot authorize a
search or seizure based on “mere suspicion”50 or “affidavits which are purely
conclusory,”51 the Supreme Court has stated that probable cause exists “where the
embarrassment.”); David E. Steinberg, The Uses and Misuses of Fourth Amendment History,
10 U. PA. J. CONST. L., 581, 581 (2008) (“The doctrinal incoherence of Fourth Amendment
law disturbs many judges and scholars.”). The Supreme Court has also been critical of its
own jurisprudence. E.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment) (“There can be no clarity in this area unless we make up our minds,
and unless the principles we express comport with the actions we take.”); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 483 (1971) (explaining that Fourth Amendment law has not been
reduced to “complete order and harmony”).
39. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); Massachusetts v. Upton, 466
U.S. 727, 733 (1984); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).
40. Kentucky v. King, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011).
41. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (emphasis omitted).
42. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (inferences should be “drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
44. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56 (1967) (acknowledging that there is an
especially great need for particularity when judicial authorization is sought for electronic
eavesdropping).
45. Fiss, supra note 27, at 20.
46. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
47. Id. at 231.
48. See Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176 (explaining that probable cause is a “practical,
nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for
accommodating . . . opposing interests”); infra note 66 and accompanying text.
49. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
50. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
51. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965).
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known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable
prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.”52
However, the Supreme Court has also stated that “finely tuned” standards, such as
preponderance of the evidence,53 are more appropriate to formal adversarial
proceedings and have “no place” in a magistrate’s probable cause determination.54
Thus, in determining whether probable cause exists, the Supreme Court has
directed magistrates and judges to look at all of the circumstances and determine
whether there is “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.”55
The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement (“no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized”)56
serves a slightly different, albeit related, purpose to the probable cause requirement.
The particularity requirement serves as a check on the government’s ability to
obtain a “general” warrant, which was a source of great concern to the Framers.57
While an academic debate may exist with regard to whether the Framers only
opposed general warrants of the home (compared to general warrants of
commercial or other highly regulated businesses)58 taken together, the Fourth
Amendment’s probable cause and particularly requirements “minimize the risk that

52. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996).
53. In order to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard, a party must establish
that “on the whole” of the evidence, he “has the stronger evidence, however slight the edge
may be.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014); see CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER &
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE, 109 (4th ed. 2009) (stating that the fact finder must be
“persuaded that the points to be proved are more probably so than not”).
54. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983).
55. Id. at 238. Moreover, the role of the reviewing court “is simply to ensure that the
magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]’ that probable cause existed.” Id. at 238–
39 (alteration in original) (citation omitted); accord Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727,
73233 (1984) (stating that the reviewing court should decide “whether the evidence viewed as a
whole provided a ‘substantial basis’ for the Magistrate’s finding of probable cause”).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
57. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (“By limiting the authorization to
search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the
requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not
take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to
prohibit.”); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (“Our cases have recognized
that the Fourth Amendment was the founding generation’s response to the reviled ‘general
warrants’ and ‘writs of assistance’ of the colonial era . . . .”); Steinberg, supra note 38, at 594
(noting that “the Framers viewed . . . the general warrant as dangerous and subject to
abuse”). For a comprehensive history of the Fourth Amendment, see generally WILLIAM J.
CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND MEANING 602–1791 (2009).
58. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967) (“The use of [general warrants]
was a motivating factor behind the Declaration of Independence.”). But see CUDDIHY, supra
note 57, at 743 (“Even the states with the strongest constitutional restrictions on general
searches had long exposed commercial establishments to warrantless inspection.”). See
generally Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV.
547, 551 (1999) (explaining that the Framers discussions were “almost exclusively about the
need to ban house searches under general warrants”).
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officers executing search warrants will by mistake search a place other than the
place intended by the magistrate.”59 In the context of the hypothetical and the need
to intercept the terrorist’s communications, the particularity requirement ensures
that the government is directed to acquire only the communications that the
magistrate has authorized. As the Supreme Court has stated, the need for
particularity here is “especially great” since wiretapping involves an “intrusion on
privacy that is broad in scope.”60 The particularity requirement therefore requires a
neutral and detached magistrate to approve the communications that may be
searched as well as the communications that may be seized.61
Finally, the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness clause (“[t]he right of the
people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated”)62 serves as an additional check on the government’s conduct by
preventing the government from exceeding the authorized scope of the warrant, and
by ensuring that the police do not act impermissibly in executing the
court-approved search or seizure.63 While some Supreme Court decisions may have
raised a question in regard to whether or not the reasonableness clause and the
warrant clause were intended to be read in the disjunctive or in the conjunctive,64
today it is “clearly established that the [reasonableness] clause does provide some
additional power.”65 Thus, even when the warrant clause is satisfied, courts are still
required to assess the degree to which a search or seizure is reasonable; that is,
courts are required to assess the degree to which the search or seizure intrudes on
an individual’s privacy in relation to “the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”66

59. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 4.5, at 709; see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551,
561 (2004) (explaining that the particularity requirement also assures the “limits” of the
search); 2 LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 4.5(b), at 731 (“A search warrant for an apartment
house or hotel or other multi-occupancy building will usually be held invalid if it fails to
describe the particular subunit to be searched with sufficient definiteness to preclude a
search of one or more subunits indiscriminately.”); 3 LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 7.2(c), at 751
(suggesting that particularity limits the intensity of the search and minimizes the risk that
innocent objects will be seized by mistake).
60. Berger, 388 U.S. at 56; see also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11
(1976) (“[R]esponsible officials . . . must take care to assure that [searches] are conducted in
a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.”).
61. See Berger, 338 U.S. at 59 (finding several constitutional defects in New York’s
wiretapping statute including that it gave “too much to the discretion of the officer executing
the order”); 5 LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 10.1(c), at 22 (explaining that because particularity
limits what a police officer may seize and where he may look, “[t]he police may not look in
an envelope for an elephant”).
62. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
63. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 611 (1999) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does
require that police actions in execution of a warrant be related to the objectives of the
authorized intrusion[.]”).
64. See Cloud, supra note 27, at 1722–23; see also Amar, supra note 24, at 76281.
65. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 3.1(a), at 4.
66. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006); see also United States v. Knights,
534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001) (“[T]he reasonableness of a search is determined ‘by assessing,
on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the
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A review of the foregoing principles and rules might lead one to conclude that it
is not possible to solve the Fourth Amendment’s no-win scenario. Yet, as discussed
below, a close examination of decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence, including a
number of exceptions that have been approved by the Court, reveals the potential
for a new doctrinal solution.
B. Exceptions
Historically, a person’s home has been given the greatest degree of protection
under the Fourth Amendment.67 Yet, the Supreme Court has not always required
law enforcement officers to obtain a warrant to enter a home and, in certain
circumstances, the probable cause and the particularity requirements have also been
relaxed, prompting one scholar to opine that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is a
“doctrinal mess.”68 This Part will review exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant, probable cause, and particularity requirements, in order to assess their
potential applicability to the hypothetical.
1. The Warrant Requirement
The Supreme Court and the federal courts have identified three related
exigent-circumstance exceptions to the warrant requirement: hot pursuit, loss or
destruction of evidence, and emergency aid.69 In Warden v. Hayden,70 the Supreme
Court recognized that the hot pursuit of a fleeing felon does not require the police
to obtain a warrant prior to entering a home. In Warden, the government had been
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.’” (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999))); Richards v.
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997) (balancing the “legitimate law enforcement concerns at
issue in the execution of search warrants and the individual privacy interests affected by noknock entries”); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (“We have described ‘the
balancing of competing interests’ as ‘the key principle of the Fourth Amendment.’” (quoting
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981))). As Professor LaFave aptly notes,
however, this “naturally raises the question of whether this ‘compromise’ must always be
struck in precisely the same way, or whether on the other hand the probable cause
requirement may call for a greater or lesser quantum of evidence, depending upon the facts
and circumstances of the individual case.” 2 LAFAVE, supra note 29, §3.2(a), at 30.
67. E.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 5354 (1993)
(stating that a person’s right to “maintain control over his home, and to be free from
governmental interference, is a private interest of historic and continuing importance”);
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (“[R]esidences are places in which the
individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a
warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as
justifiable. Our cases have not deviated from this basic Fourth Amendment principle.”);
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (“It is a ‘basic principal of Fourth
Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable.”).
68. Amar, supra note 24, at 759; id. at 757 (observing that warrants are required, unless
they are not, and that the probable cause requirement has often been ignored).
69. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 116 n.6 (2006).
70. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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informed that an armed robbery had taken place and the suspect had fled into a
home “less than five minutes before they reached it.”71 Although the police had a
description of the suspect and the weapons he had used during the robbery, the
Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to obtain a
warrant and delay the investigation if doing so would “gravely endanger their lives
or the lives or others.”72 The Court further stated that “[s]peed here was essential,
and only a thorough search of the house for persons and weapons could have
insured that [the suspect] was the only man present and that the police had control
of all weapons which could be used against them or to effect an escape.”73
Stated another way, Warden and its progeny stand for the proposition that where
probable cause to obtain a warrant exists but the exigency of the particular situation
makes it impossible to obtain a warrant, the Fourth Amendment will tolerate a
warrantless entry into a home to make an arrest.74 Notably, however, the Supreme
Court has observed that many lower courts have looked at the hot pursuit exception
in relation to the crime that has been committed, and the gravity of the offense.75
That consideration becomes significant as we consider whether consequence, which
is directly tied to the gravity of the risk posed by a WMD, should play an
outcome-determinative role in a Fourth Amendment analysis.
The Supreme Court has also relaxed the warrant requirement to prevent the loss
or destruction of evidence. For example, in Schmerber v. California,76 the
defendant was under arrest in a hospital for driving while under the influence of
alcohol. The Court concluded that the police could take a blood sample from the
defendant without a warrant since there had been a lawful arrest, and delay could
lead to a destruction of the evidence.77 Indeed, when emergency or exceptional
circumstances threaten the loss or destruction of evidence, the federal courts have
consistently approved warrantless searches.78 Here too, however, even where the
government can establish a potential loss of evidence, the Court has rejected a
warrantless entry into a home if the offense the government is pursuing is only a

71. Id. at 298.
72. Id. at 29899.
73. Id. at 299.
74. See id. at 298–99; Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984); United States v.
Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 4243 (1976).
75. E.g., Welsh, 466 U.S. at 752; United States v. Cattouse, 846 F.2d 144, 146 (2d Cir.
1988) (finding that the gravity of the offense is a relevant factor in determining whether
exigent circumstances exist); United States v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 686 F.2d 93, 100–01 (2d
Cir. 1982) (noting the seriousness of the offense justifying warrantless entry); Dorman v.
United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (emphasizing the gravity of the offense).
76. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
77. Id. at 770. One of the underlying rationales for the automobile search exception to
the warrant requirement is the potential for the loss of evidence. See Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970) (noting that vehicles can be “quickly moved”).
78. E.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). Compare United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951) (finding unlawful entry where there was no imminent
destruction, removal, or concealment of property) with McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451, 455 (1948) (noting that there was no property that was in the process of being destroyed).
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minor one,79 which further suggests that the nature of an offense is important and
can play a limiting role as well.
The Supreme Court has also approved warrantless entry into a home to assist a
person in need of immediate aid.80 The Court has stated that “[t]he need to protect
or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise
illegal absent an exigency or emergency.”81 Moreover, the Court has approved the
use of a brief “protective sweep” in a home without a warrant, if the sweep was
preceded by a lawful arrest of an occupant of the home.82 The Court has made it
clear in the protective sweep cases, however, that the burden is on the government
to establish a reasonable basis to believe that the area “harbors an individual posing
a danger to those on the arrest scene.”83 Indeed, such a search must be limited in
time and location; that is, it must be “no longer than is necessary to dispel the
reasonable suspicion of danger” and limited to places where a person, not evidence,
might be located.84
These cases illustrate that the protection and preservation of life is a factor that
could justify what might otherwise be an unacceptable intrusion on privacy.
However, they also stand for the proposition that important limiting considerations
exist, even when there is danger to life.
2. The Probable Cause Requirement
As discussed earlier, probable cause is at the core of the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement. Yet, the Supreme Court has relaxed the probable cause
requirement in what have become known as the “special needs”85 or
“administrative search”86 cases, thereby enabling the government to conduct

79. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750; 3 LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 6.5(a), at 515 (suggesting
that exigent circumstances has a “hollow ring” when there is no emergency and evidence is
not in the process of destruction); see also MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE,
§ 260.5 (1973) (stating that a warrantless search of premises may be undertaken upon
reasonable cause to believe that premises contain “(1) individuals in imminent danger of
death or serious bodily harm; or (2) things imminently likely to burn, explode, or otherwise
cause death, serious bodily harm or substantial destruction of property”).
80. E.g., Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 549 (2009) (per curiam).
81. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (quoting Wayne v. United States, 318
F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963)).
82. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990) (approving a warrantless protective
sweep of premises following an in-home arrest in order to find others who might pose a
danger to officers).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 334 (approving a “look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the
place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched”).
85. E.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (random drug
testing of student athletes); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
665–66 (1989) (drug tests for United States Customs Service employees seeking transfer or
promotion to certain positions); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 620–21
(1989) (drug and alcohol tests for railway employees involved in train accidents or found to
be in violation of particular safety regulations).
86. E.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702–04 (1987) (warrantless administrative
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certain kinds of warrantless searches without probable cause or any degree of
individualized suspicion.87 In these cases, which generally developed outside of the
terrorism context, the Court upheld suspicionless, and sometimes warrantless,
searches that furthered a “special need[], beyond the normal need for law
enforcement.”88 The Court looked at the “programmatic purpose”89 that motivated
the government’s conduct to ensure that the government was seeking to protect
against a “concrete danger”90 independent of general law enforcement purposes.91
If the Court found such a programmatic purpose, as in the case of sobriety
checkpoints where the animating purpose is to eliminate the “immediate,
vehicle-bound threat to life and limb”92 that results from the presence of intoxicated
drivers on the public highways, then it would uphold the search and seizure.93
While a compelling governmental need is a prerequisite for the relaxation of
the probable cause requirement in these cases, as the Supreme Court has made
clear, alone it has not been sufficient. Essential to the Court’s analyses has been the
consideration of other factors, such as the reasonableness of the search and the
level of intrusion on an individual’s privacy.94 For example, in upholding a
inspection of premises of “closely regulated” business); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499,
507–09, 511–12 (1978) (administrative inspection of fire-damaged premises to determine
cause of blaze); Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 534–39 (1967) (administrative
inspection to ensure compliance with city housing code that was not aimed at “the discovery
of evidence of crime”).
87. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 489 U.S. at 665 (emphasizing that “neither a
warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure of individualized suspicion, is an
indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance”). See generally 5
LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 10.1.
88. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997).
89. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45–46 (2000) (“[P]rogrammatic
purposes may be relevant to the validity of Fourth Amendment intrusions undertaken
pursuant to a general scheme without individualized suspicion.”).
90. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318–19.
91. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987) (plurality opinion) (“There are
some . . . ‘exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’”
(quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 335, 351 (1985))); In re Directives Pursuant to
Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1011–12 (Foreign
Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2008) (finding a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment
because national security is of “the highest order of magnitude” and the “programmatic
purpose of the surveillances . . . involves some legitimate objective beyond ordinary
crime control”); Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 82 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Preventing or
deterring large-scale terrorist attacks present problems that are distinct from standard law
enforcement needs and indeed go well beyond them.”); cf. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 43 (“We are
particularly reluctant to recognize exceptions to the general rule of individualized suspicion
where governmental authorities primarily pursue their general crime control ends.”).
92. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 43 (discussing Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444, 451 (1990)).
93. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451 (1990) (“[A]lcohol-related death and mutilation on the
Nation’s roads are legion.”).
94. E.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830–38 (2002) (holding that the school’s
interest in preventing drug use outweighed limited intrusion and reduced privacy interests);
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119–20 (2001) (holding probationers and parolees
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drug-testing program for the Vernonia, Oregon, school district—one that was not
predicated on probable cause—Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a majority of
the Court, stated that “the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a
governmental search is ‘reasonableness,’” particularly in cases where there was “no
clear practice, either approving or disapproving the type of search at issue, at the
time the constitutional provision was enacted.”95 Whether a particular search meets
the reasonableness standard should be “judged by balancing its intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.”96
None of the cases in which the Supreme Court relaxed the probable cause
requirement to allow the government to meet special or administrative search needs
arose in the context of the government seeking to prevent the use of a WMD. On
the other hand, the Court opined in the dicta of Keith, which concerned electronic
surveillance conducted by the government in connection with a plot to bomb a
Central Intelligence Agency office in Michigan, that reasonableness was a flexible
standard that should be adapted to the government’s need.97 The Court stated in
Keith that “[d]ifferent standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if
they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for
intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens.”98 Although Keith
involved an American political group and not foreign powers and their agents,99 it
was followed by decisions of the Courts of Appeal for the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and
Ninth Circuits, each of which found a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement.100 When that question was presented to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, the special Article III appellate
court established by Congress to review foreign intelligence collection by the
executive branch, the FISA Court of Review explicitly stated that while “threat to
society is not dispositive in determining whether a search or seizure is reasonable,
it certainly remains a crucial factor.”101
Determining that a programmatic102 need to address foreign national security
threats can support a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
have diminished expectations of privacy); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315–16
(1972) (discussing a business fully aware of the pervasive regulation in their field and thus
having a reduced expectation of privacy).
95. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S 646, 652 (1995).
96. Id. at 652–53 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619
(1989)); see also supra note 66 and accompanying text.
97. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972). The case is known as
Keith because the government filed a writ of mandamus against the Honorable Damon Keith,
United States District Court Judge, when he ordered the government to disclose wiretapping
information.
98. Id. at 322–23 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 321–22.
100. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593,
605 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973). But see
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 613–14 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc).
101. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (emphasis
added).
102. E.g., In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence
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warrant requirement, however, does not provide strong precedent for the notion that
the gravity of the offense permits the government to target an indeterminate number
of communication devices in the United States in response to a specific,
intelligence-driven WMD threat. Yet more than sixty years ago (and three years
before he issued his seminal concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure case)103,
Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson planted the seeds of the principle that
consequence could be a factor in determining whether or not to relax the probable
cause requirement. In Brinegar v. United States,104 the defendant was prosecuted
for illegally importing liquor into Oklahoma from Missouri, and his conviction was
based, in part, on the use of evidence seized from his automobile.105 Prior to trial,
Brinegar moved to suppress the evidence, and the Court held that there was
probable cause to search his automobile.106 In his dissent, Justice Jackson expressed
concern that the Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception107 was being taken as
“blanket authority to stop and search cars on suspicion”108; that is, without probable
cause. Justice Jackson then suggested that the gravity of the offense should be
considered in certain circumstances.109 He spoke specifically to the issue of
indiscriminate searches performed by police officers:
[I]f we are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment . . . ,
it seems to me they should depend somewhat upon the gravity of the
offense. If we assume, for example, that a child is kidnapped and the
officers throw a roadblock about the neighborhood and search every
outgoing car, it would be a drastic and undiscriminating use of the
search. The officers might be unable to show probable cause for
searching any particular car. However, I should candidly strive hard to
sustain such an action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it
might be reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1011–12 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2008) (stating that
the programmatic purpose of FISA collection is a “legitimate objective beyond ordinary
crime control”). It should be noted that in 2008, Congress amended FISA and expanded the
definition of “foreign power” and agents thereof to include an “entity not substantially
composed of United States persons” or “any person other than a United States person” who
is “engaged in the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 1222 Stat. 2436 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(a)(7), (b)(1)(E)) (2008). This 2008 amendment, however,
does not solve the issue posed by the hypothetical because, unlike the hypothetical, FISA
requires that when the government seeks to target communications devices in the United
States, it must target a specific communications device or facility. See 50 U.S.C.
§ 1805(a)(2)(B) (2012) (stating probable cause is required with respect to “each of the
facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to
be used by a foreign power or agent of a foreign power”).
103. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 634–55
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
104. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
105. Id. at 161–62.
106. Id. at 177–78.
107. The automobile exception was first articulated by the Supreme Court twenty-four
years earlier in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151–53 (1925).
108. 338 U.S. at 183 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
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only way to save a threatened life and detect a vicious crime. But I
should not strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal search to
salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger.110
More than three decades later, the Supreme Court referenced gravity of the
offense in a number of cases discussing the Fourth Amendment. In Mincey v.
Arizona,111 the Court was confronted with a case in which, after arresting the
defendant for shooting a police officer, the police had conducted a four-day
warrantless search of the defendant’s apartment.112 In Mincey, the Court rejected
the notion that gravity of the offense was sufficient to justify the warrantless search
when it explicitly rejected a murder-scene exception to the warrant requirement.113
However, in Welsh v. Wisconsin,114 decided six years later, the Court seems to have
taken a different view. In Welsh, the police had gained entry into a home without a
warrant in connection with their investigation of a car accident.115 Writing for the
majority, Justice William Brennan stated that “an important factor to be considered
when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying
offense for which the arrest is being made.”116 Six months after Welsh was decided,
Justice John Paul Stevens observed in another case that “a standard that varies the
extent of the permissible intrusion with the gravity of the suspected offense is . . .
consistent with common-law experience and this Court’s precedent”117 and was
almost “too clear for argument.”118 Indeed, later that year, the Court recognized a
crime-severity distinction in Tennessee v. Garner119 when it held that the use of
deadly force was reasonable in self-defense or when there was “probable cause to
believe that [the suspect] has committed a crime involving the infliction or
threatened infliction of serious physical harm.”120
Fifteen years later, two cases reached the Supreme Court in which the Court
alluded to the issue of whether there should be different Fourth Amendment
standards for grave threats. At issue in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond121 was a

110. Id. (emphasis added). Arguably the seed was planted by Justice Jackson six months
earlier. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459–60 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting to obtain a
warrant certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the offense thought to be in progress
as well as the hazards of the method of attempting to reach it.” (emphasis added)).
111. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
112. Id. at 388–89.
113. Id. at 390.
114. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
115. Id. at 742–43.
116. Id. at 753 (emphasis added).
117. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 378–79 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 380.
119. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
120. Id. at 11 (emphasis added). Jeffrey Bellin has concluded that Garner provides
“doctrinal support” for the principle that “[a]s a matter of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness, crimes involving the threat of serious physical harm warrant more intrusive
government responses than crimes that do not.” Bellin, supra note 24, at 32.
121. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
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drug interdiction checkpoint that had been established by law enforcement
authorities. After reviewing a series of decisions that involved suspicionless
roadblocks and checkpoints, including the border search and drunk-driving
roadblock cases, the Court stated that the “gravity of the threat alone cannot be
dispositive of questions concerning what means law enforcement officers may
employ to pursue a given purpose.”122 Although combatting illegal narcotics
trafficking was a “social harm[] of the first magnitude,”123 it did not reach the level
that warranted a relaxation of the Fourth Amendment’s individualized suspicion
(probable cause) requirement. Since the primary purpose of the drug interdiction
checkpoint was indistinguishable from a “general interest in crime control,” the
checkpoint ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment.124 Notably, however, in a statement
remarkably reminiscent of Justice Jackson’s dissent in Brinegar, Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor, writing for the majority of the Court, stated that “the Fourth
Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set
up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is
likely to flee by way of a particular route.”125
The second case decided by the Supreme Court in 2000 that alluded to
circumstances involving a grave offense was Florida v. J.L.,126 a stop and frisk
case. In J.L., the police received an anonymous tip that a “young black male
standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.”127
When the police responded to the location, they observed three individuals, one of
whom was wearing a plaid shirt.128 Apart from the tip, the police had no reason to
suspect illegal conduct by any of the individuals.129 Nonetheless, the police stopped
the individuals, frisked them, and discovered a firearm.130 The Court held that the
tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability and was not, without more, sufficient to
justify a police officer’s stop and frisk.131 The Court noted that the tip “provided no
predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the
informant’s knowledge or credibility.”132 Although the Court stated that “[f]irearms
are dangerous, and extraordinary dangers sometimes justify unusual
precautions,”133 it declined to adopt a firearm exception under which a tip alleging
an illegal gun would justify a stop and frisk. The majority then went on to state the
following in regard to a circumstance where there might be an extraordinary
danger, such as a report of a person carrying a bomb: “The facts of this case do not

122. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 44.
125. Id. (emphasis added). But see Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347–50
(2001) (rejecting a distinction between minor and other crimes when determining whether
warrantless arrests are permissible).
126. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
127. Id. at 268.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 271–74.
132. Id. at 271.
133. Id. at 272 (emphasis added).
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require the Court to speculate about the circumstances under which the danger
alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search even without a
showing of reliability.”134
In the past decade, two Supreme Court decisions have referenced gravity of the
offense as a potential factor in a Fourth Amendment calculus. In Illinois v.
Lidster,135 the Court addressed the issue of whether brief stops of motorists at
highway checkpoints, which were designed to enable the police to obtain
information about a recent fatal hit-and-run accident, were presumptively
unreasonable. After reviewing its decision in Edmond, the Court noted that brief
information-seeking highway stops were “less likely to provoke anxiety or to prove
intrusive,”136 and that in judging reasonableness, courts should also “look to ‘the
gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, [and] the degree to which the
seizure advances the public interest.’”137
If the seeds of the gravity of the offense principle were planted by Justice
Jackson in Brinegar and were watered by Justice O’Connor in Edmond, then they
were surely nourished by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in United States
v. Jones.138 Jones involved the question of whether the attachment of a GPS
tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, and the subsequent use of that device to
monitor the vehicle’s movements on the public street by the government,
constituted a search.139 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia concluded that the
installation of the GPS device constituted a trespass and therefore was a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.140 Notably, however, Justice Samuel
Alito, writing for three other Justices and concurring in the judgment of the Court,
stated that “the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most
offenses impinges on expectations of privacy, . . . [and the Court] need not consider
whether prolonged GPS monitoring in the context of investigations involving
extraordinary offenses would similarly intrude on a constitutionally protected
sphere of privacy.”141

134. Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
135. 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
136. Id. at 425.
137. Id. at 427 (emphasis added) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)).
Notably, in his dissent in Illinois v. Caballes, a case involving a narcotics-detection dog who
altered as to the presence of marijuana in an automobile, Justice David Souter pointed out
that the Court should not
prejudge a claim of authority to detect explosives and dangerous chemical or
biological weapons that might be carried by a terrorist who prompts no
individualized suspicion. Suffice it to say here that what is a reasonable search
depends in part on demonstrated risk. Unreasonable sniff searches for
marijuana are not necessarily unreasonable sniff searches for destructive or
deadly material if suicide bombs are a societal risk.
543 U.S. 405, 417 n.7 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
138. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
139. Id. at 948.
140. Id. at 950 n.3 (“Where, as here, the Government obtains information by physically
intruding on a constitutionally protected area, [a Fourth Amendment] search has undoubtedly
occurred.”).
141. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Justice Alito’s concurring opinion prompted Justice Scalia to write that Fourth
Amendment distinctions based on the nature of the offense would introduce a
“novelty into our jurisprudence” because “[t]here is no precedent for the
proposition that whether a search has occurred depends on the nature of the crime
being investigated.”142 However, Justice Alito’s view was shared by Justices Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan. Moreover, it was explicitly
accepted by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor
wrote that she “agree[d] with Justice ALITO that, at the very least, longer term
GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of
privacy.”143 Thus, although Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, the
fact that five Justices have recently expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment
should treat most offenses similarly, as opposed to all offenses, suggests that those
Justices might agree with the central thesis of this Article—namely, that the Fourth
Amendment should treat grave offenses differently, particularly when the
government is trying to prevent massive destruction or the catastrophic loss of life.
In the state courts, perhaps the most notable decision to express the view that
gravity of future harm could justify a warrantless search on less than probable
cause was People v. Sirhan.144 After Senator Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated,
law enforcement officers in Los Angeles, California, believed that there might be a
conspiracy afoot to kill other prominent government leaders, and they concluded
that they needed to take “prompt action.”145 In upholding the warrantless search of
the room occupied by Sirhan, who was later convicted of assassinating Senator
Kennedy, the California Supreme Court took note of the gravity of the offense and
the “effect on this nation if several more political assassinations had followed that
of Senator Kennedy.”146 The court then upheld the warrantless search, even though
there was only a “mere possibility” that there might be evidence.147
Prior to Jones, the admittedly fleeting references to the role that gravity of the
offense should play in a Fourth Amendment calculus prompted Jeffrey Bellin to
observe that “[t]he bulk of Fourth Amendment doctrine is transsubstantive, either

142. Id. at 954. The majority refrained from “rushing forward” to resolve this issue, which
it called “thorny” and “vexing.” Id. But cf. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013)
(approving the use of DNA testing as a post-arrest booking procedure for “serious” offenses).
143. 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
144. 497 P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1972).
145. Id. at 1138–40.
146. Id. at 1140.
147. Id. Other state supreme courts have also discussed how the nature of the offense
affects Fourth Amendment questions. E.g., Butler v. State, 829 S.W.2d 412, 414–15 (Ark.
1992) (noting “an important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency
exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made.”); People v.
Miller, 773 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Colo. 1989) (looking to whether “a grave offense is involved,
particularly in a crime of violence” when determining whether sufficient exigency exists to
justify a warrantless search of a home); Commonwealth v. Roland, 637 A.2d 269, 270 (Pa.
1994) (acknowledging that the gravity of the offense is a factor in determining whether
exigent circumstances exist to justify a warrantless search); State v. Smith, 199 P.3d 386,
389 (Wash. 2009) (explaining that circumstances may be exigent if they satisfy a “totality of
the situation” test which includes a factor described as “the gravity or violent nature of the
offense with which the suspect is to be charged”).
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by virtue of the Supreme Court’s explicit rejection of crime severity as a valid
Fourth Amendment consideration, or the Court’s pointed omission of that
consideration from its analysis.”148 On the other hand, in his multivolume Fourth
Amendment treatise, Wayne R. LaFave says that it is “tempting to conclude that
the seriousness of the offense should be a factor in the probable cause equation, and
that therefore this sub rosa practice of taking the offense into account should be
recognized and legitimated.”149 Carol Steiker echoes that sentiment, stating that
such an approach may be precisely what the Framers had intended through the use
of the term unreasonable.150 Akil Amar has written that it makes “intuitive sense to
police officials and citizens alike: serious crimes and serious needs can justify more
serious searches and seizures.”151 Amar further says that “[i]t would make little
sense to insist on the same amount of probability regardless of the imminence of
the harm, the intrusiveness of the search, the reason for the search, and so on.”152
Ric Simmons believes that suspicionless searches in areas where individuals do not
have diminished expectations of privacy could be upheld if the government simply
agreed to forgo the use of the fruits of the searches in other prosecutions.153 While this
bright-line rule154 clearly has merit, and the fact that an aggrieved person155 could

148. Bellin, supra note 24, at 17.
149. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 3.2(a), at 38. Gravity of the harm was considered to be
an important factor by the drafters of the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure that
was proposed in 1975. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 6.5(d), at 576 (summarizing section
260.5 of the 1975 Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure “to the effect that a
warrantless search of premises may be undertaken upon reasonable cause to believe that
premises contain . . . things immediately likely to burn, explode, or otherwise cause death,
serious bodily harm, or substantial destruction of property”).
150. Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820,
824 (1994) (noting that unreasonable “positively invites constructions that change with
changing circumstances”); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (“The
Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all [government-initiated] searches and seizures; it
merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.”).
151. Amar, supra note 24, at 802; see also Simmons, supra note 13, at 895 (“[I]f police
have twenty-four hours to find an atomic bomb that they know is hidden in one of a hundred
houses, it would be reasonable for them to conduct suspicionless searches of each of those
houses.”). Cf. Bellin, supra note 24, at 6 (arguing that judges should “incorporate the
severity of the crime being investigated into determinations of constitutional
reasonableness . . . [to] grant the government more leeway in investigations of the gravest
offenses, while simultaneously enabling concrete limits on investigations of minor crimes”);
Gould & Stern, supra note 24, at 777, 819–23 (2004) (“[T]raditional [Fourth Amendment]
doctrine falls short in an age of threats unprecedented in their potential for harm.”); Stuntz,
supra note 24, at 875 (discussing how “some crimes are worse than others . . . [and] the
worst crimes are the most important ones to solve, the ones worth paying the largest price in
intrusions on citizens’ liberty and privacy”).
152. Amar, supra note 24, at 784.
153. Simmons, supra note 13, at 916.
154. Id. at 884–88.
155. FISA defines an “aggrieved person” as “a person who is the target of an electronic
surveillance or any other person whose communications or activities were subject to
electronic surveillance.” 50 U.S.C. § 1801(k) (2012). Title III defines an “aggrieved person”
as “a person who was a party to any intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication or a
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bring a civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 might serve as an ex ante
check on the government’s conduct,156 these approaches do not, by themselves,
sufficiently protect privacy. Moreover, as discussed in Part III, there are serious
definitional issues that need to be resolved by the political branches of government,
and failing to resolve those issues could lead, as Owen Fiss fears, to “great abuse,”157
which could end up proving the adage that “hard cases make bad law.”158
At the same time, any potential solution to the hypothetical must be workable
and address the administrability concerns raised by the Supreme Court.159
Moreover, the solution must be sufficiently flexible to enable the executive branch
to respond to dynamic and potentially unpredictable circumstances.160 Government
officials who are responsible for protecting the nation from terrorists seeking to
cause massive destruction or a catastrophic loss of life need greater ex ante
certainty that their preventative actions are constitutional.161 Thus, if there is to be a
person against whom the interception was directed.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11) (2012).
156. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
397 (1971) (holding that “petitioner is entitled to recover money damages for any injuries he
has suffered as a result of the agents’ violation of the [Fourth] Amendment”). However, the
Court’s statement that “no special factors counseling hesitation” were present, id. at 396, has
led some lower courts to carve out exceptions related to national security. See Meshal v.
Higgenbotham, No. 1:09–2178 (EGS), 2014 WL 2648032, at *12 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Under
Lebron [v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012)], Doe [v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir.
2012)], and Vance [v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012)], . . . when a citizen’s rights are
violated in the context of military affairs, national security, or intelligence gathering Bivens is
powerless to protect him.”). As a result, Steve Vladeck has concluded that there is a
“vanishingly small set of challenges to national security policies that will be justiciable.”
Stephen I. Vladeck, The New National Security Canon, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1328 (2012).
157. See Fiss, supra note 27, at 29.
158. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
159. E.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001) (noting that the
Fourth Amendment needs “to be applied on the spur (and in the heat) of the moment” and
that there is an “essential interest in readily administrable rules”); Michigan v. Summers, 452
U.S. 692, 705 n.19 (1981) (suggesting police need “workable rules”); see Bellin, supra note
24, at 21 (“[T]he few commentators who squarely address the subject sketch in exceedingly
broad strokes, ultimately failing to address the Supreme Court's administrability concern.”).
160. See Kevin Johnson, Mueller’s Doomsday Scenario: Attack on Aircraft, USA TODAY,
Aug. 23, 2013, at 5A (discussing the substantial challenges faced by the FBI including the
“unpredictable nature of attackers acting alone”); see also Stew Magnuson, FBI Anticipates
Terrorist Attacks on Soft Targets in the United States, NAT’L DEF. MAG., May 2011, at 14
(“Soft targets are now a priority for terrorists determined to inflict damage in the United
States.”); Scott Stewart, The Persistent Threat to Soft Targets, STRATFOR GLOBAL
INTELLIGENCE (July 26, 2012, 4:04 AM), http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/persistent-threat
-soft-targets (discussing the evolving paradigm shift by terrorists from “hard” to “soft” targets).
161. See James A. Baker, Constitution Day Address at the Dickinson College Clarke
Forum for Contemporary Issues: National Security and the Constitution (Sept. 12, 2013), at
9, available at http://clarke.dickinson.edu/wp-content/uploads/Dickinson-Constitution-Day
-Talk-12-Sept-2013.pdf (“Our surveillance and privacy laws need an overhaul. For example,
it is often still too difficult to figure out what is lawful and what is not. This negatively
impacts both intelligence collection and privacy protection. Out of confusion, lawyers can
say no when they should say yes, and yes when they should say no.”).
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solution to the no-win scenario, it must include additional principles and measures
beyond the previous discussions. As discussed below, a deep dive into the Fourth
Amendment’s particularity requirement and minimization principles suggests a
constitutional foundation upon which a new doctrinal solution to the hypothetical
can be constructed.
3. The Particularity Requirement
As discussed earlier in the context of court-authorized wiretaps, particularity
requires the judicial branch to approve the specific communications that the
government may lawfully acquire.162 Yet, the Supreme Court has upheld a wiretap
order that permitted the government to acquire virtually every communication that
was taking place on a lawfully targeted device.163 How can we square that result
with the particularity requirement? The answer lies in how courts apply
minimization principles to the government’s conduct.
When the government obtains the contents of telephone or e-mail
communications, its conduct can be divided into three stages: the acquisition stage,
which refers to the stage when the government obtains the communications in the
first instance either through a monitoring or a recording device; the retention stage,
which refers to the government’s ability to keep the communications it has initially
obtained; and the dissemination stage, which refers to the government’s ability to
share the communications.164 Minimization requires the government to reduce—to
minimize—the amount of irrelevant information that it acquires, retains, and
disseminates.165 For example, if the government was to target a suspected spy’s
telephone, the government could acquire all of the communications that took place
on that telephone, including when the spy’s wife used the telephone. If the
government concludes that the spy’s wife is not involved in her husband’s
clandestine intelligence activities, then the wife’s communications (though lawfully
acquired) should be destroyed, as well as the spy’s communications that are
irrelevant to his spying activities.166 Thus, minimization is typically viewed as a
back-end requirement because, even though the executive branch may have taken
“great care”167 when it initially acquired the communications, its conduct would

162. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56–57 (1967).
163. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 141–43 (1978).
164. See 1 DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS &
PROSECUTIONS § 9:1 (2d ed. 2012).
165. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 69 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2192–93.
This minimization requirement has become an integral part of Title III. See 18 U.S.C. §
2518(5) (2012). See generally 1 KRIS & WILSON, supra note 164, § 9:1, at 321–22
(“Minimization governs the implementation of electronic surveillance and physical searches to
ensure that they conform to their authorized purpose and scope, and requires the government to
‘minimize’ the amount of irrelevant information that it acquires, retains, and disseminates.”).
166. S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 38 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3939.
167. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354 (1967) (observing that the agents took
“great care” to only overhear Katz’s conversations in the phone booth).
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nonetheless run afoul of the Fourth Amendment if it did not “minimize[]
unwarranted intrusions of privacy.”168
The leading Supreme Court case to address minimization is Scott v. United
States.169 In Scott, government agents were authorized to intercept virtually all of
the telephone conversations that were made to or from a particular telephone.170
Although the supporting affidavits in Scott named nine individuals involved in a
narcotics conspiracy, the district court authorized the government to intercept the
communications of those nine persons as well as “other persons [who] may make
use of the facilities.”171 After the wiretap ended, twenty-two persons were arrested
and before the trial, the defendants moved to suppress the evidence.172 Among
other things, the defendants argued that the government failed to comply with its
minimization obligations since the government intercepted virtually all of the
communications but only minimized 40 percent of them.173
In analyzing the reasonableness of the government’s conduct, the Supreme
Court emphasized in Scott that it was important to consider the circumstances of
the wiretap.174 The Court then noted that there should be no “inflexible rule,” and
that “when an investigation is focusing on a widespread conspiracy, more extensive
surveillance may be justified in an attempt to determine the precise scope of the
enterprise.”175 For example, the Court noted that in the early stages of surveillance
the government may need “to intercept all calls to establish categories of
nonpertinent calls which will not be intercepted thereafter.”176
Scott was not the first case in which the Supreme Court observed that
minimization should be calibrated to the nature of harm being investigated. The
Court had noted in Keith that national security surveillance is “often long range and
involves the interrelation of various sources and types of information.”177 Thus,
since some telephone calls may be ambiguous or involve guarded or coded
language, the Court concluded in Scott that it would not be unreasonable under
certain circumstances to intercept “almost every short conversation because the
determination of relevancy cannot be made before the call is completed.”178 The
federal courts of appeals have also observed that, as long as the government makes
a “good faith effort to minimize . . . irrelevant information,” there is no prohibition

168. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976) (In executing warrants that
authorize “the ‘seizure’ of telephone conversations . . . responsible officials, including
judicial officials, must take care to assure that they are conducted in a manner that minimizes
unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.”).
169. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
170. Id. at 130.
171. Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 132.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 140.
175. Id. at 139–40 (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 141 (emphasis added).
177. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972).
178. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. at 141 (emphasis added).

2015]

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S “NO-WIN” SCENARIO

25

on the retention of “innocuous” communications that “may later turn out to be of
great significance.”179
The legislative branch has also previously concluded that the Fourth
Amendment can tolerate the acquisition of irrelevant and even innocent
communications in certain circumstances. At the time FISA was enacted in 1978,
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) noted in its report
that the executive branch should not be required to make an “instantaneous
identification” of communications that may contain valuable foreign intelligence
information.180 Moreover, HPSCI stated in its report that there could be
circumstances where the government may retain the communications of “innocent
persons” to identify other individuals who may be involved in a wide-ranging and
clandestine conspiracy that threatens the national security of the United States.181
Finally, HPSCI stated in its report a view that was shared by the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)—namely, that in certain investigations, there could
very well be “technological reasons” that would prevent minimization at the
acquisition stage.182 Thus, as HPSCI and SSCI noted in each of their reports, in some
cases, “it may not be possible or reasonable to avoid acquiring all conversations.”183
The foregoing discussion shows that both the legislative and the judicial
branches have concluded that the Fourth Amendment can tolerate the acquisition of
all communications in certain circumstances provided that minimization takes place
on the back end. Minimization principles therefore provide “sufficient latitude to
meet Fourth Amendment particularity requirements.”184 Observing that these two
branches have viewed minimization as a constitutionally acceptable method of
balancing competing Fourth Amendment interests suggests the potential for a new

179. United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 334 (4th Cir. 2004). Indeed, as the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted, Fourth Amendment reasonableness requires
that the intrusion on privacy be weighed against the “government’s surveillance needs.” See
In re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d 157, 175 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Our balancing of these
compelling, and competing, interests turns on whether the scope of the intrusion here was
justified by the government’s surveillance needs.”). After examining a number of
minimization factors, the Court found that the interception of all communications with an
alleged terrorist was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because even though privacy
intrusion may have been “great, the need for the government to so intrude was even greater.”
Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
180. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 58 (1978) (advising that it is permissible to retain
and to a limited extent disseminate information in “bits and pieces before their full
significance becomes apparent”); see also 1 KRIS & WILSON, supra note 164, § 11:10, at 414
(“[U]nder FISA depending on the case, the recording devices may or may not be left on, and
minimization occurs, among other places, in the process of indexing and logging the
pertinent communications.”).
181. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt.1, at 58 (approving the acquisition and retention of the
communications of a “large number of innocent persons . . . at least until it is determined that
they are not involved in the clandestine intelligence activities”).
182. Id. at 55 (“[I]n many cases, it may not be possible for technical reasons to avoid
acquiring all communications.”); S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 40 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 4009 (noting the technological impossibility of acquiring all situations).
183. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 56 (emphasis added). Accord S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 40.
184. 1 KRIS & WILSON, supra note 164, § 11:6, at 408.
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doctrinal solution to the no-win scenario—namely, that the Fourth Amendment’s
particularity requirement could be satisfied in the context of the hypothetical by
moving minimization from the back end to the front end. In other words, in certain
circumstances, post-interception minimization could satisfy what would normally
be a pre-interception particularity requirement.
The question, however, is whether such a “marginal adjustment”185 should be
made every time the government seeks to prevent a potentially grave consequence,
or only in a limited and carefully delineated186 set of catastrophic consequences.
Here, our hypothetical looks at the threatened use of a WMD. Part II will therefore
provide an overview of four different types of WMDs and the different
consequences that can be reasonably anticipated from their respective use.
II. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
In May 2010, President Barack Obama stated in a national security strategy
report that there was “no greater threat to the American people than weapons of
mass destruction, particularly the danger posed by the pursuit of nuclear weapons
by violent extremists and their proliferation to additional states.”187 Although some
believe that terrorists may be more focused on the acquisition and use of
conventional weapons rather than WMDs,188 one expert has identified a number
of reasons why a violent extremist group may wish to use a WMD, including:
(a) the psychological impact that such a weapon would have on the American
public; (b) the economic, political, and social instability that would reasonably
be expected to follow the use of a WMD; (c) the physical destruction that
could be caused to critical infrastructure, loss of life, and contamination to
vital areas; (d) the “state-like” prestige that a terrorist group perceives it would
receive from the use of a WMD; (e) a “fetishistic predisposition” toward the use
of a WMD; (f) defensive aggression if the group perceived its own destruction
was imminent; or (g) the group’s need to outdo destruction that was caused by
another group.189 Terrorists who are motivated by religious beliefs and seek

185. See RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF
EMERGENCY 1 (2006) (explaining “the marginal adjustments in [constitutional] rights that
practical-minded judges make when the values that underlie the rights—values such as
personal liberty and privacy—come into conflict with values of equal importance, such as
public safety, suddenly magnified by the onset of a national emergency”).
186. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
187. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 4 (2010), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
Former President George W. Bush issued a similar warning in 2002. See EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
at v (2002), available at
www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf (“The gravest danger our Nation faces
lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that
they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so
with determination.”).
188. See Rachel Oswald, Despite WMD Fears, Terrorists Still Focused on Conventional
Attacks, GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/despite
-wmd-fears-terrorists-still-focused-conventional-attacks/.
189. See Nuclear Terrorism Hearing, supra note 3, at 2–3 (statement of Gary Anthony
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“fundamental changes in the existing order” may also be far more willing to engage
in “large-scale violence” and attacks involving mass casualties.190
Any discussion concerning the threatened use of a WMD, however, needs to
take into account that WMDs “differ sharply in character and in their effects.”191
Indeed, one expert cautions that there are “broad differences in the lethality of each
type of weapon,” and contrary to conventional wisdom, “[t]here is no reason to
assume that [the] effect[] of [a] WMD should be measured in terms of mass
casualties or mass destruction.”192 In June of 2009, the Department of Defense
adopted the following definition of a WMD: “chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear weapons capable of a high order of destruction or mass casualties.”193
Accordingly, in order to provide a baseline for a discussion about WMDs, Part II
focuses on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, as well as the
anticipated consequences that could flow from the use of each of these weapons.194
A. Chemical Weapons
Chemical weapons are some of the oldest weapons to be considered weapons of
mass destruction.195 For example, toxic fumes were reportedly used as a weapon in
India as far back as 2000 BC.196 It was the scientific revolution of the late
nineteenth century, however, that gave chemicals the potential to become major
weapons of war.197
Chemical weapons may exist as solids, gases, or liquids and their effects can be
immediate and deadly. For example, through breathing, ingestion, or skin contact,
chemical weapons can adversely affect the nervous system and the blood system,
Ackerman, Research Director, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland).
190. See BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 94–95 (1998).
191. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, TERRORISM, ASYMMETRIC WARFARE, AND WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION: DEFENDING THE U.S. HOMELAND 97 (2002).
192. Id.
193. W. SETH CARUS, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, DEFINING “WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION” 1–2 (2012),
available at http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/occasional/cswmd/CSWMD
_OccationalPaper-8.pdf (citing Joint Publication 3–40, Combating Weapons of Mass
Destruction (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff 2009)).
194. The cybersecurity risks facing the nation have been described in ominous tones by
current and former high-ranking government officials. See Glick, supra note 26, at 101–02
(describing how “a major cyber attack could shut down our Nation’s most critical
infrastructure: our power grid, telecommunications, [and] financial services.” (alteration in
original) (citations omitted)); see also Bill Gertz, Inside the Ring: New WMD Threats,
WASH. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2012, at A09 (“A Pentagon-sponsored report warns that the United
States faces new threats from mass destruction weapons in the form of cyber, electronic and
financial attacks, in addition to more well-known dangers from nuclear, chemical and
biological WMD arms.”). These risks may very well lead policymakers to conclude that
legislative changes are also needed to address cyber weapons.
195. Markus Binder & Michael Moodie, Jihadists and Chemical Weapons, in JIHADISTS AND
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 131, 131 (Gary Ackerman & Jeremy Tamsett eds., 2009).
196. Id.
197. Id.
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which can lead to choking or blisters.198 Blister agents, such as mustard gas, are
“oily liquids that inflict chemical burns on the skin or any other part of the body
with which they come into contact, including the lungs if they are inhaled.”199 On
the other hand, blood agents, such as cyanide, refer to chemical agents that
“achieve their effects by traveling through the blood stream to sites where the agent
can interfere with oxygen utilization at the cellular level.”200 Similarly, choking
agents, such as chlorine, “attack the airways and cause swelling and edema in the
lung tissues.”201 Nerve agents, such as sarin gas, “inhibit the function of vital
enzymes in the human body,” and experts consider them to be the “most widely
feared category of chemical weapon because of the speed and severity of their
impact.”202 Finally, incapacitating agents, which also act upon the central nervous
system and affect consciousness, memory, problem solving, attention, and
comprehension, generally are not lethal, and instead “disable the target personnel
for hours if not days after exposure.”203
The “effects of chemical weapons are normally seen over a smaller area [than
their nuclear and biological counterparts], and they have been traditionally viewed
as more effective at the tactical or operational level rather than at the strategic
level.”204 Moreover, “in contrast to biological weapons, which are . . . slow-acting,
the effects of exposure to chemical weapons can become apparent within minutes
or at most hours of initial contact.”205 Since “[l]arge amounts of [chemical] agents
are required to achieve high lethality,”206 unless chemical weapons are being used
by a nation state,207 their strategic value for a terrorist group with limited resources
may derive more from their potential to cause a psychological impact than from

198. Id. at 133 (“Western categorization systems separate military [chemical weapons]
agents into several different categories, largely depending on how they work in the body.”).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 134.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 132.
205. Id.
206. CORDESMAN, supra note 191, at 98. The most recent reported use of a chemical
weapon is the alleged use of chlorine gas by the Islamic State against Iraqi security forces.
See Loveday Morris, Islamic State Militants Allegedly Used Chlorine Gas Against Iraqi
Security Forces, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world
/middle_east/islamic-state-militants-allegedly-used-chlorine-gas-against-iraqi-security
-forces/2014/10/23/c865c943-1c93-4ac0-a7ed-033218f15cbb_story.html?hpid=z1.
207. Two recently reported uses of chemical weapons by nation-states are the 1988 attack
by former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein against the Kurdish town of Halabja and the use of
chemical weapons by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in 2012 and 2013. See Press Release,
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, U.S. Government Assessment of the Syrian
Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013, (August 30, 2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/30/government-assessment-syrian
-government-s-use-chemical-weapons-august-21; Joby Warrick, Why Do Chemical Weapons
Elicit a Different Response?, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2013, at A12.
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their ability to cause mass casualties, as terrorists seek to frighten populations and
military units.208
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that while the effects that flow from the use of
chemical weapons can be assessed fairly quickly, their lethality can vary if the
resources and delivery mechanisms that are available are limited. As discussed
below, the fact that chemical weapons vary significantly in their effects raises
critical issues directly tied to how the reasonableness question in the hypothetical
should be resolved.209
B. Biological Weapons
From smallpox to bubonic plague, humanity has faced numerous naturally
occurring diseases that “evoke images of horror and suffering.”210 As a result of
their “ability to cause pervasive mortality, naturally occurring diseases have been
used as weapons of war and terror for thousands of years.”211
Generally speaking, biological weapons are infectious agents that “are produced
from pathogenic microorganisms or [other] toxic substances of biological origin . . .
[which] are capable of disabling and/or killing people, crops, and livestock.”212 In
addition to smallpox, some of the more well-known types of biological weapons
include anthrax, salmonella, ebola, and ricin.213
In contrast to chemical weapons, which can produce immediate effects, because
“most biological weapons consist of living organisms, symptoms will occur only
after an incubation period that may last days to weeks.”214 Moreover, the initial
symptoms from the use of biological weapons may very well appear as the
“common cold or influenza and might be mistaken for a normal outbreak of
infectious disease.”215 In the absence of a specific intelligence-driven threat stream
or a claim of responsibility, detecting a biological terrorist attack may require
reports of illness or death from a large number of persons, which can be
particularly difficult to parse during the cold and flu season.216
The Centers for Disease Control categorize biological weapons according to
lethality, dividing them into three categories. Category A agents include organisms

208. Binder & Moodie, supra note 195, at 132.
209. See infra Parts IV and V.
210. Cheryl Loeb, Jihadists and Biological and Toxic Weapons, in JIHADISTS AND
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, supra note 195, at 153, 153.
211. Id.; see also James W. Martin, George W. Christopher & Edward M. Eitzen, Jr.,
History of Biological Weapons: From Poisoned Darts to Intentional Epidemics, in MEDICAL
ASPECTS OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 1 (Zygmunt F. Dembek ed., 2007), available at
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=19931.
212. Loeb, supra note 210, at 154.
213. Id. at 154–55.
214. Id. at 154. See Edward Eitzen, Use of Biological Weapons, in MEDICAL ASPECTS OF
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 437, 439 (Frederick R. Sidell, Ernest T. Takafuji &
David R. Franz eds., 1997), available at http://dead-planet.net/chemical-terrorism/med_cbw
/Ch20.pdf (“Very few biological agents are immediately lethal.”).
215. Loeb, supra note 210, at 154.
216. Id.
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that pose “a high risk to national security because they can be easily disseminated
or transmitted person to person; result in high mortality rates. . . [;] have the
potential for major public health impact; might cause public panic and social
disruption; and require special action for public health preparedness.”217 Category
B agents can lead to moderate illness rates and low death rates.218 Lastly, Category
C agents have a potential for high illness and death rates because they “could be
engineered for mass dissemination.”219
One expert has observed that some biological weapons “offer a means of attack
that is potentially cheap, lethal, and hard to detect.”220 The most effective means of
distributing a biological weapon is in the form of a dry or wet aerosol, which
typically is a “cloud of solid particles suspended in the air.”221 Although other
means of delivery may include cluster bombs, artillery shells, rockets, and
sophisticated sprayers, the use of large-scale delivery systems is thought to be
associated with the military development of biological weapons.222 Other
nontechnical and less expensive delivery mechanisms include human self-infection
or the use of animal vectors, improvised crop-dusting airplanes, small backpack
sprayers, or purse-sized atomizers.223
Some biological weapons can be highly inefficient because they largely depend,
in the case of open air delivery mechanisms, on “meteorological and terrain
conditions such as wind velocity, temperature, precipitation, and humidity.”224
Indeed, “[o]nly a small number of the hundreds of bacteria and viruses are viable as
terrorist weapons; most cannot survive outside of narrow margins of temperature
range or are too rare or hard to grow.”225 In addition, “[m]ost wet agents degrade
quickly, although spores, dry encapsulated agents, and some toxins are persistent.”226
Contaminating food and water supplies on a large scale would therefore pose
challenges to terrorists because of the quality control processes that exist in the
food supply chain. Moreover, one expert notes that terrorists who rely on biological
weapons have to contend “with incremental degradation over time due to
transporting materials from the point of acquisition or production to the point of
use, not to mention ensuring [that] a suitably virulent strain has been properly and
effectively weaponized.”227
The effectiveness of biological weapons is also dependent on factors such as
“choice of agent, type of formulation, and the manufacturing process employed.”228

217. Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. CORDESMAN, supra note 191, at 139.
221. Loeb, supra note 210, at 156.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 157.
225. MATT LAWRENCE, WHAT TO DO ‘TIL THE CALVARY COMES: A FAMILY GUIDE TO
PREPAREDNESS IN 21ST CENTURY AMERICA 114 (2006).
226. CORDESMAN, supra note 191, at 99.
227. Loeb, supra note 210, at 157.
228. Id.
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One expert cautions, however, that while many biological weapons would likely result
in low mortality rates, some biological weapons could be far more lethal than chemical
weapons.229 The widespread use of certain agents, such as small pox or plague, could
lead to widespread morbidity and mortality, as well as the “specter of enforced
quarantine.”230 In addition, “the lack of a discreet endpoint . . . [could further] heighten
the psychological effects on the targeted population.”231 Thus, biological attacks can
cascade into “high-levels of anxiety, widespread fear, and perhaps even paranoia,
leading to self-isolation . . . and social disruption to civil society.”232
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the effects that flow from the use of
biological weapons cannot be assessed as quickly as the effects that flow from the
use of chemical weapons, and their lethality can vary significantly depending on a
variety of factors. This variation, as discussed below, raises critical issues directly
tied to how the Fourth Amendment should resolve the question of what types of
searches are reasonable in the face of threatened use of a biological weapon.233
C. Radiological Weapons
Radiological weapons, which are a relatively new category of WMDs, are
weapons that contain large amounts of ionizing radiation.234 If ingested or inhaled
in sizeable amounts, ionizing radiation can lead to radiation sickness or cancer.235
Radiological weapons can range from “crude explosive devices to sophisticated
dispersal mechanisms.”236 Although radiological weapons can take many forms,
one expert cautions that a radiological weapon should “not be confused with a
nuclear weapon, and the effects of the two weapons differ greatly.”237 For example,
radiological weapons can consist of more conventional explosives, such as
dynamite, attached to some type of radioactive material.238 However, the resulting
blast from such a weapon—the so-called dirty bomb—would “do a very poor job at
effectively spreading out radioactive material in ways that can do serious harm to
health or result in significant radioactive contamination that is hard to clean up.”239
One expert believes that “for most scenarios involving radiological weapons, . . .
few, if any, people near the scene of an attack would succumb to serious and
immediate health effects.”240 “To experience these effects, individuals would have
to receive relatively high exposures of ionizing radiation[,]”241 and even then it

229. CORDESMAN, supra note 191, at 151.
230. Loeb, supra note 210, at 160.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See infra Parts IV and V.
234. Charles D. Ferguson, Radiological Weapons and Jihadist Terrorism, in JIHADISTS
AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, supra note 195, at 173, 179.
235. Id. at 173.
236. Id. at 184.
237. Id. at 174.
238. CORDESMAN, supra note 191, at 194.
239. Ferguson, supra note 234, at 184.
240. Id. at 173.
241. Id.
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could take upwards of decades for cancer to develop after exposure. Thus, while
the “psychological and social consequences of a radiological attack could linger for
years,” a radiological weapon “cannot produce a nuclear chain reaction and will
not, consequently, result in a massive explosion.”242
The lethality of radiological weapons can therefore be indeterminate “because of
the time required to accumulate a disabling or significant dose of radiation through
ingestion, inhalation, or exposure.”243 On the other hand, since radiation destroys
human cells, and radiation poisoning can cause untreated victims to dehydrate and
bleed to death, some radiological weapons, even in minute quantities, can be deadly.244
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the effects that flow from the use of
radiological weapons can vary. As a result, radiological weapons may be more
suitable for “terror, political, and area denial purposes, rather than for mass
killings.”245 As discussed below, this raises critical issues directly tied to how the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness question should be resolved.246
D. Nuclear Weapons
More than any other WMD that could be used by a terrorist, a nuclear weapon
would “represent a ‘game-changing’ event far exceeding the impact of 9/11.”247
“Nuclear weapons draw their explosive force from fission, fusion, or a combination
of these two methods.”248 While one expert believes that a fusion-based nuclear
weapon would be “too sophisticated for fabrication” by terrorists, and while
fissionable materials exist only in very minute quantities, purchasing, stealing, or
otherwise obtaining highly enriched types of uranium, plutonium, or similar
materials would enable terrorists with sophisticated knowledge and expertise to
make an improvised nuclear device.249
The energy that results from a nuclear weapon is generally grouped into five
effects: (1) blast effects, (2) thermal effects, (3) radiation effects,
(4) electromagnetic effects, and (5) climate effects.250 A nuclear weapon could be
detonated in the air, at either low or high altitudes, underwater, underground, or on
the surface of the planet.251 Depending upon the size of the weapon (frequently

242. Id. at 174.
243. CORDESMAN, supra note 191, at 194.
244. Ferguson, supra note 234, at 185.
245. CORDESMAN, supra note 191, at 194.
246. See infra Parts IV and V.
247. Nuclear Terrorism Hearing, supra note 3, at 1 (statement of Gary Anthony
Ackerman, Research Director, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism).
248. Charles P. Blair, Jihadists and Nuclear Weapons, in JIHADISTS AND WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION, supra note 195, at 193, 195.
249. Id. at 195–203.
250. See Effects of Nuclear Weapons, NUCLEAR DARKNESS, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE &
NUCLEAR
FAMINE:
THE
DEADLY
CONSEQUENCES
OF
NUCLEAR
WAR,
http://www.nucleardarkness.org/nuclear/effectsofnuclearweapons/.
251. See John Pike, Nuclear Weapon Effects, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS (Oct. 21, 1998, 4:35
PM), http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/effects.htm. See generally SAMUEL GLASSTONE
& PHILIP J. DOLAN, THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (3d ed. 1977).
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expressed in terms of kilotons and yield), the location of the blast, and the
characteristics of the environment, everything in the immediate vicinity of “ground
zero”252—the point on the Earth's surface closest to the point of a nuclear
detonation—would vaporize from the initial blast.253 A fireball would then
immediately rise, expand, and cool, giving the appearance of a mushroom cloud.254
The blast would also produce a shock wave and “vaporized matter [would]
condense [into] a cloud containing solid particles of weapon debris” contaminated
by radioactivity, which would disperse over a vast area.255 A high-altitude nuclear
detonation could also produce an electromagnetic pulse, resulting in a sudden burst
of electromagnetic radiation that could have catastrophic and devastating effects to
critical infrastructures for power, transportation, telecommunications, banking,
finance, food, and water.256
The detonation of a nuclear WMD would, therefore, lead to short-term as well as
long-term physical, health, environmental, social, and psychological effects. Those
effects would be felt in varying degrees based on a number of factors, including
distance from the point of the blast.257 Since the detonation of a single nuclear
weapon could produce massive destruction and loss of life on an unimaginable
scale,258 it truly qualifies as the most devastating weapon of mass destruction.

252. The first use of the term “ground zero” may have been in connection with the
Manhattan Project and the bombing of Japan. William Laurence, a reporter embedded with
the Manhattan project, reported that “Zero” was “the code name given to the spot chosen for
the atomic bomb test.” See WILLIAM L. LAURENCE, DAWN OVER ZERO: THE STORY OF THE
ATOMIC BOMB 4 (1946).
253. See Effects of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 250; Alexander Glaser, Effects of
Nuclear Weapons, PRINCETON U. (Feb. 12, 2007), http://www.princeton.edu/~aglaser
/lecture2007_weaponeffects.pdf.
254. See Glaser, supra note 253.
255. Id.
256. See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE: EFFECTS ON
THE U.S. POWER GRID i (2010) (“The nation’s power grid is vulnerable to the effects of an
electromagnetic pulse (EMP), a sudden burst of electromagnetic radiation resulting from a
natural or man-made event. EMP events occur with little or no warning and can have
catastrophic effects, including causing outages to major portions of the U.S. power grid
possibly lasting for months or longer.”). Compare JOHN S. FOSTER, JR., EARL GJELDE,
WILLIAM R. GRAHAM, ROBERT J. HERMANN, HENRY M. KLUEPFEL, RICHARD L. LAWSON,
GORDON K. SOPER, LOWELL L. WOOD, JR. & JOAN B. WOODARD, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
TO ASSESS THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES FROM ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP)
ATTACK 1 (2004) (“The electromagnetic fields produced by weapons designed and deployed
with the intent to produce EMP have a high likelihood of damaging electrical power
systems, electronics, and information systems upon which American society depends. Their
effects on dependent systems and infrastructures could be sufficient to qualify as
catastrophic to the Nation.”), with Roscoe Bartlett, Foreword to MARK SCHNEIDER, NAT’L
INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y, THE EMERGING EMP THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES (2007) (“A highaltitude nuclear-generated electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack can have devastating
consequences on our society by destroying the electronic systems that support our critical
infrastructures for power, transportation, telecommunications, banking and finance, and food
and water.”).
257. See Glaser, supra note 253.
258. See supra notes 250–56 and accompanying text.
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III. DEFINITIONAL ISSUES
At this point, it is appropriate to restate the hypothetical and further highlight
why it matters that different consequences can reasonably be anticipated from the
use of different WMDs. In our hypothetical, a reliable informant has told the
government that a highly skilled terrorist, has entered the United States and is
assembling a WMD at a safe house sometime within the next thirty to forty-five
days. The government does not know the precise location of the terrorist or the
specific telephone or e-mail account that is being used by him, but the informant is
80 percent certain that the safe house is located somewhere in Georgetown, fewer
than two miles from the White House.259 Finding and preventing the terrorist from
using the WMD is clearly the paramount goal for the government.260
Noticeably absent from the fact pattern, however, is the specific type of WMD
that is being assembled. This point is critical. As discussed in Part II, the use of
different types of WMDs can lead to different consequences. This point takes on
exceptional importance because a close examination of U.S. law reveals significant
definitional issues. Indeed, as the Congressional Research Service has noted, the
“term ‘WMD’ is problematic from an analytic perspective . . . [because it] implies
that [these weapons] are similar even though each type differs greatly from the
others in its mechanisms and effects,”261 and because, as discussed below, the
definition under U.S. law could include a more conventional weapon. For example,
in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,262 Congress
defined a WMD broadly to include chemical, biological, and radiological weapons,
as well as “any destructive device as defined in section 921 of this title.”263
Reference to section 921 is particularly challenging from the perspective of the
hypothetical because it defines the term “destructive device” to mean:
any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas—(i) bomb, (ii) grenade, (iii)
rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, (iv) missile

259. The Federal Emergency Management Administration has studied the truly horrifying
effects that would flow from the detonation of a ten kiloton improvised nuclear device at the
intersection of 16th and K Streets, NW, Washington, D.C., which is approximately a
five-minute walk from Georgetown. See B.R. Buddenmeier, J.E. Valentine, K.K. Millage &
L.D. Brandt, Key Response Planning Factors for the Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism, FED.
AM. SCIENTISTS (Nov. 2011), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/fema/ncr.pdf.
260. Although assembling a WMD is also a criminal act, prosecution clearly remains the
lowest priority in this scenario. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 727 (Foreign Int. Surv.
Ct. Rev. 2002) (“The government’s overriding concern is to stop or frustrate the agent’s or
the foreign power’s activity by any means, but if one considers the actual ways in which the
government would foil . . . terrorism it becomes apparent that criminal prosecution
analytically cannot be placed easily in a separate response category.”); see also, Scott J.
Glick, FISA’s Significant Purpose Requirement and the Government’s Ability to Protect
National Security, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 87, 110 (2010) (noting the hybrid nature of some
national security investigations).
261. See JONATHAN MEDALIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41890, “DIRTY BOMBS”:
TECHNICAL BACKGROUND, ATTACK PREVENTION AND RESPONSE, ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3 (2011).
262. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1980 (1994).
263. 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(c)(2)(A) (2012).
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having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter
ounce, (v) mine, or (vi) device similar to any of the devices described
in the preceding clauses.264
FISA’s WMD definition adds further complexity to the discussion. Under FISA,
a WMD includes “any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas device that is designed,
intended, or has the capability to cause a mass casualty incident.”265 On the other
hand, the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 uses a
different measurement of consequence.266 Instead of referencing a “mass casualty
incident,” this statute defines WMD as “any weapon or device that is intended, or
has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of
people through the release, dissemination, or impact of—(A) toxic or poisonous
chemicals or their precursors; (B) a disease organism; or (C) radiation or
radioactivity.”267
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the failure of the hypothetical to
specify the type of WMD is critical. While the media may understand or represent
WMDs as a “monolithic menace,”268 members of the legislative branch, as the
elected representatives of the people, have an essential role to play in making
“intellectually rigorous distinctions”269 among different types of WMDs before we
can assess whether, and the degree to which, consequence should matter. Once
those definitional challenges are resolved, however, the question then turns to
whether in a particular case, it would be reasonable to move minimization from the
back end to the front end to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity
requirement. Part IV therefore explores an analytical framework that may be used
in assessing the role of consequence in particular sets of circumstances.

264. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4)(A)(i)–(vi) (2012). In addition to these explosive, incendiary,
or poison gas devices, section 921 defines a “destructive device” to include the following:
“any type of weapon (other than a shotgun or a shotgun shell which the Attorney General
finds is generally recognized as particularly suitable for sporting purposes) by whatever
name known which will, or which may be readily converted to, expel a projectile by the
action of an explosive or other propellant, and which has any barrel with a bore of more than
one-half inch in diameter.” Id. § 921(a)(4)(B).
265. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(p) (Supp. 2014) (emphasis added).
266. 50 U.S.C. § 2302(1) (2012).
267. Id. (emphasis added). Dr. Seth Carus, Deputy Director and Distinguished Research
Fellow at the National Defense University, has compiled these differences under U.S. law,
and he has also pointed out that twenty-two states have laws that contain WMD definitions
and that a number of different WMD definitions also appear in international law. See Carus,
supra note 193, Appendix C–D.
268. SUSAN D. MOELLER, CTR. FOR INT’L AND SEC. STUDIES AT MD., MEDIA COVERAGE OF
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 3 (2004), available at http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers
/files/wmdstudy_full.pdf.
269. Carus, supra note 193, at 47. An overly broad statutory definition of a weapon of
mass destruction may also affect the “usual constitutional balance of federal and state
powers.” Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2089 (2014) (finding that the federal
chemical weapons statute does not apply to the defendant’s conduct).
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IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S PROTECTIVE LENS AND THE
PROBABILITY CONSEQUENCE MATRIX
A number of scholars have written about the importance of adopting readings of
the Constitution that preserve its original values.270 The underlying values of the
Fourth Amendment, which are “basic to a free society,”271 include the “protect[ion]
of personal privacy . . . against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”272 A person
who places a private telephone call is “entitled to assume that the words he utters
into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.”273 The same can be said of
private e-mail communications.274 Indeed, unless the government’s ability to
intercept communications is checked, wiretapping devices pose a real and
significant threat to liberty.275
However, as discussed earlier, it is essential not to confuse the reasonable
expectation of privacy test, which enables us to determine whether a search has
occurred, with the separate question of whether a search is reasonable. Amar
reminds us that, in sorting through Fourth Amendment questions, we cannot
abandon common sense and must find constitutional reasonableness.276 The
Supreme Court itself has stated that the Fourth Amendment does not protect against
“all intrusions . . . but against intrusions which are not justified in the
circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.”277
Thus, reasonableness should not be assessed in a vacuum and without
consideration of the government’s interest. Fourth Amendment reasonableness
should be viewed contextually and assessed under particular facts and
circumstances. In the context of the threatened use of certain WMDs, it is hard to
imagine a governmental interest more compelling than the preservation and
protection of society from existential threats, massive destruction, or catastrophic
loss of life, which is clearly a constitutional value of the “highest order of
magnitude.”278 Indeed, Article IV of the Constitution imposes an affirmative
obligation on the federal government to protect the nation.279

270. E.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 165, 222 (1999).
271. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
272. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
273. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
274. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010). The Sixth Circuit
also observed, however, that in some cases, subscriber agreements might be “sweeping enough
to defeat a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of an email account.” Id. at 286.
275. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967).
276. See Amar, supra note 24, at 802–06.
277. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013) (quoting Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966)).
278. In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1012 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2008); see also Haig v. Agee, 453
U.S. 280, 307 (1981).
279. See U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion . . . .”); see also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 611–12 (1985) (“Few
interests can be more compelling than a nation’s need to ensure its own security. . . . Unless
society has the capability and will to defend itself from the aggressions of others,
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The Constitution requires consideration of all of these values and leads to a
number of key questions when a suspected terrorist threatens to use a WMD: first,
how can we reconcile these seemingly competing values—individual privacy and
an extraordinarily compelling government interest—so that they are mutually
reinforcing and not mutually exclusive; and, second, who gets to decide how we
should reconcile them?280 Layered on top of these questions are additional
considerations. As noted earlier, in a crisis involving a specific and credible threat
by a terrorist to use a WMD, government officials should have greater ex ante
certainty in regard to the constitutionality of their preventative actions.281
Moreover, any new doctrinal solution must be appropriately flexible to enable
those government officials to adapt to what may be dynamic or unpredictable
circumstances. Finally, as Bellin has cautioned, solutions must be workable and
address the Supreme Court’s administrability concerns.282
I have previously written about the importance of using the correct lens to
analyze Fourth Amendment issues.283 “The ‘lens’ method of analysis is based on
the premise that one has a better chance of arriving at the correct [analytical] result
only if one begins the analysis with the correct lens.”284 Here, the correct lens to
apply is the Fourth Amendment’s protective lens, which looks to consequence as a
constitutionally appropriate factor in assessing whether the government’s conduct
is reasonable.285 Notwithstanding our stipulation that expectations of privacy would
be at their zenith with respect to the government’s acquisition of the content of
telephone and e-mail communications, it is simply not acceptable to conclude that
the Constitution abides no solution to the hypothetical. Indeed, as Russell Covey
has observed, “The gravity of the threat posed by WMD, made or hidden in private
residences, suggests that a Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that constructs a

constitutional protections of any sort have little meaning.”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 662 (1952) (Clark, J., concurring) (“In my view . . .
the Constitution does grant to the President extensive authority in times of grave and
imperative national emergency. In fact, to my thinking, such a grant may well be necessary
to the very existence of the Constitution itself.”); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its
doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of
Rights into a suicide pact.”). See generally Charles L. Black, Jr., Mr. Justice Black, the
Supreme Court, and the Bill of Rights, HARPER’S MAG., Feb. 1961, at 63, 68 (arguing
justifications that are put forward for infringing the Bill of Rights should not be ignored
when they arise from an “altogether different order of magnitude”).
280. See Stuntz, supra note 24, at 875 (“[S]olutions to hard problems can never be found
unless the system grapples with the right questions. That is the central problem with Fourth
Amendment law as it stands today: it fails to ask the right questions.”).
281. See Baker, supra note 161, at 9–10.
282. See Bellin, supra note 24, at 21 (“[T]he few commentators who squarely address the
subject sketch in exceedingly broad strokes, ultimately failing to address the Supreme
Court's administrability concern.”).
283. See Glick, supra note 26, at 124.
284. Id.
285. See supra notes 104–52 and accompanying text.
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relatively impermeable wall around the home or any other ‘constitutionallyprotected area’ is imprudent and potentially disastrous.”286
In thinking about a path towards a constitutional solution to the hypothetical, it
is important to precisely examine where the tension arises. By any measure, based
upon the information provided by a reliable informant, the government’s
information with respect to the terrorist’s conduct is well beyond the minimum
threshold set by the Supreme Court with respect to probable cause.287 However, in
addition to not knowing the type of WMD that is being assembled, the other critical
piece of information missing from the hypothetical is the identification of the
particular communication device that the terrorist is using. If we lived in a world in
which there were only cellular telephones and there was only one cell tower288 that
transmitted all cellular telephone calls to and from Georgetown, or a world in
which there was only one router289 through which all of the Internet traffic in
Georgetown flowed, then arguably, the constitutional tension in the hypothetical
would not exist.290 Clearly, however, we live in a world in which there are
numerous cell towers, Internet routers, and landline telephones, any of which could
be carrying the terrorist’s communications. The questions can then be restated as
follows: using the Fourth Amendment’s protective lens, is there any framework

286. Russell D. Covey, Pervasive Surveillance and the Future of the Fourth Amendment,
80 MISS. L.J. 1289, 1300 (2011); see also Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 675 n.3 (1989) (“As Judge Friendly explained in a leading case upholding [airport
security screening] searches: ‘When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and
millions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a large airplane, that
danger alone meets the test of reasonableness . . . .’” (emphasis in original) (quoting United
States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974))).
287. See supra notes 46–55 and accompanying text.
288. Cell towers, sometimes referred to as cell sites, are the physical locations at which
the antennas and associated electronic equipment that are used for transmitting wireless
telephone communications are placed. See HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON’S TELECOM
DICTIONARY 265 (Steve Schoen ed., 26th ed. 2011). “Cell sites may be located on
stand-alone towers or on top of pre-existing buildings,” Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone
Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV.
681, 683 n.10 (2011), and whenever a user places or receives a voice call (or sends or
receives a text message), the radio portion of that communication is transmitted between the
customer’s handset and a nearby tower. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)
(Part II): Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, Homeland Sec., and Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th
Cong. 6–7 (2013) (statement of Mark Eckenwiler, Senior Counsel, Perkins Coie LLP). See
generally, Marshall Brain, Jeff Tyson & Julia Layton, How Cell Phones Work, HOW STUFF
WORKS, (Nov. 14, 2000), http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/cell-phone.htm.
289. See
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
INTERNET
TRAFFIC
REPORT,
http://www.internettrafficreport.com/faq.htm#router (“Routers are traffic cop computers on
[the] Internet . . . [that are] responsible for redirecting data from sender to receiver. When
major routers slow down or stop, it has an adverse affect [sic] on Internet data flow in that
region.”). See generally BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND
INNOVATION 84 (2010) (“The Internet . . . connects different physical networks using a set of
conventions that let computers attached to these networks communicate.”).
290. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 55–56 (1978) (“[W]here a switchboard line is
tapped . . . it may not be possible or reasonable to avoid acquiring all conversations.”).
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that could be used to solve the no-win scenario? And what role is played by the
type of WMD to be deployed?
One potential framework would be to use a probability consequence matrix. For
purposes of this discussion, let us assume that there are two variables in this
matrix—probability and consequence—and within those variables, at least in the
matrix’s simplest form, let us further assume that there are two categories: high and
low. When there is a high probability of a high consequence WMD being deployed,
we should use minimization as a front-end substitute for the Fourth Amendment’s
particularity requirement. On the other hand, when there is a low or a high
probability of only a low consequence WMD being deployed, then perhaps we
should not rely on minimization to satisfy the particularity requirement. Such reliance
would arguably be, in Fourth Amendment parlance, unreasonable. See below.
Table 1. The probability consequence matrix

Low Consequence
High Consequence

Low Probability

High Probability

No
??

No
Yes

Concluding that minimization on the front end can serve as a substitute for the
Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement in a limited and carefully delineated
set of circumstances does not completely solve the “no-win” scenario. As
illustrated above, the most difficult circumstance to resolve is where there is a low
probability of a high consequence attack. One day, technology may provide a
solution.291 Until then, the probability consequence matrix can provide an analytical
framework for policymakers to debate the issues. It should be recognized, however,
that the range of potential circumstances will likely result in a more complex matrix
because probability and consequence should be viewed in the WMD context as a
sliding scale.
With respect to high probability/high consequence events, however, additional
steps must be taken by both the executive branch and the judicial branch to ensure
that individual privacy rights are protected and the government’s conduct is
appropriately cabined. These steps must include specific minimization procedures.
Drawing upon FISA’s definition, the procedures should “minimize the acquisition
and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information
concerning United States persons consistent with the need” to protect against the

291. To the extent that voice-to-text transcription technology for wire communications
evolves in the future to a point at which automated processes can accurately screen the
content of the communications, the use of such technology, coupled with minimization on
the front end, would prevent any human observation of the content of the communications.
Compare Ads in Gmail, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/mail/answer/6603?hl=en (“Ad
targeting in Gmail is fully automated, and no humans read your email or Google Account
information in order to show you advertisements or related information.”), with Orin S. Kerr,
Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 535 (2005) (arguing that
a Fourth Amendment search is best described as the process by which “data is exposed to
human observation”).
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specific WMD threat.292 Among other things, live monitoring should take place,
and as soon as the government determines that it has targeted a communication
device that is not being used by the terrorist or one of his co-conspirators, the
government should cease to target that device, and all previously acquired
communications from that device should be destroyed. Such procedures should also
require the government to promptly notify the court if further intelligence or
investigative activity allows it to narrow the ongoing surveillance.
Resolving the constitutional tension present in the hypothetical therefore
requires the executive branch to submit narrowly tailored and specifically designed
minimization procedures to the judicial branch for approval, and requires the
judicial branch to closely oversee the executive branch throughout the surveillance
period in order to hold the delicate balance between competing constitutional
values “steady and true.”293 However, the solution also requires the legislative
branch to resolve the definitional issues highlighted by Parts II and III; moreover,
other important steps must also be taken. Part V discusses these additional steps.
V. A PATH FORWARD
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that “the ultimate touchstone of
the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’”294 and “particularized exceptions . . .
are sometimes warranted.”295 The hypothetical raises competing constitutional
values: the protection of individual privacy on the one hand, and the preservation
and protection of society from existential threats, massive destruction, or
catastrophic loss of life, on the other hand. The Fourth Amendment should not,
however, paralyze the judicial branch and leave the nation “stuck in a zero-sum
world,”296 particularly when the legislative branch can play an important

292. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2012) (definition of minimization procedures); cf. 50 U.S.C.
§ 1801(e)(1)(A)–(B) (2012) (definition of foreign intelligence information).
293. See In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1016 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2008) (“[T]he
Constitution is the cornerstone of our freedoms, and the government cannot unilaterally
sacrifice constitutional rights on the altar of national security. Thus, in carrying out its
national security mission, the government must simultaneously fulfill its constitutional
responsibility to provide reasonable protections for the privacy of United States persons. The
judiciary’s duty is to hold that delicate balance steady and true.”).
294. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart,
547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)); Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 548 (2009) (per curiam);
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822,
828 (2002) (“‘[R]easonableness’ . . . is the touchstone of the constitutionality of a
governmental search.”); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001); Illinois v.
McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (stating that the Fourth Amendment’s “central
requirement is one of reasonableness”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995) (“[T]he ultimate measure of
the constitutionality of a governmental search is ‘reasonableness.’”).
295. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997).
296. Ric Simmons, Ending the Zero-Sum Game: How To Increase the Productivity of the
Fourth Amendment, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 575 (2013); see also Covey, supra
note 286, at 1300 (“[T]he proliferation of destructive technologies and the increasing ease of
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constitutional role in determining what is reasonable in the context of the
hypothetical. Ric Simmons believes that legislative interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness clause are arguably “superior to judicial
determinations,” and “deference to legislators seems even more sensible in the
context of antiterrorism searches.”297 At a minimum, as Fiss has stated, the
“President and the Congress are coordinate branches of government . . . charged
with the duty of giving concrete meaning to the Constitution.”298
More than fifty years ago in Keith, the Supreme Court recognized Congress’s
constitutional role to consider the policy and practical considerations that are
present when the government seeks to use wiretaps to protect the nation from grave
threats.299 Given the different consequences that can be reasonably anticipated from
the use of different types of WMDs, it is clear that the legislative branch has a
constitutional role to play in determining what is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment in the context of the hypothetical. The legislative branch should
resolve the definitional issues highlighted by Parts II and III, and identify the
specific showings that the executive branch should be required to make to the
judicial branch. In this regard, the legislative branch should also determine the
nature and extent of any deference that it believes the judicial branch should give to
the executive branch with respect to these showings.300 Indeed, how the legislative
branch would resolve these questions is likely to be quite different from how the
judicial branch would resolve them.
The failure of the legislative branch to debate all of the issues in a timely
manner would be most unfortunate. Congressional inertia or indifference to these
issues may leave the judicial branch without criteria to evaluate whether the
manufacturing them will continually increase the hazards of placing off-limits any physical
locations to preventative surveillance efforts by the state.”).
297. Simmons, supra note 13, at 900. In 1978, the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence certainly agreed with this assessment as well. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt.
2, at 21–22 (1978) (“[T]he decision as to the standards governing when and how foreign
intelligence electronic surveillance should be conducted is and should be a political decision,
in the best sense of the term, because it involves the weighing of important public policy
concerns—civil liberties and the national security.”).
298. Fiss, supra note 27, at 25; see also Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis
Review of General Suspicionless Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93, 131–37
(2007) (arguing that suspicionless searches are constitutional if they have been approved by
a legislative body); id. at 197 (“Courts should trust the political process to approve the right
balance when it comes to searches and seizures of groups of ordinary citizens.”). But see
Stephen Schulhofer, Pleasant Surprises—and One Disappointment—in the Supreme Court’s
Cell Phone Decision, JUST SECURITY (June 27, 2014, 10:45 AM), http://justsecurity.org
/12312/pleasant-surprises-disappointment-supreme-courts-cell-phone-decision/ (arguing that
Fourth Amendment concerns “cannot be met by porous safeguards that mainstream voters
may consider ‘reasonable’”).
299. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 322–23 (1972).
300. Although the Supreme Court has suggested that the judicial branch could consider
giving “heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters
of national security,” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001), and has noted that courts
have been “reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in . . . national security
affairs,” Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988), this does not mean that Congress
should not debate the degree to which there should be deference to the executive branch.
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threatened use of a particular type of WMD should qualify for this new doctrinal
solution. Indeed, inaction by Congress may very well “put judges into the business
of making exceptions to a standard rule that is not easily cabined and is at odds
with their obligation to say what the law is.”301
The role of the judicial branch would, by no means, be a “rubberstamp.”302 The
Supreme Court made clear in Keith that federal judges have the ability to
understand national security matters, as more than three decades of jurisprudence
has confirmed.303 This point is important to emphasize: part of the solution
proposed in this Article requires a “neutral and detached”304 magistrate to
determine whether the executive branch has met well-defined standards that have
been publicly debated and approved by the legislative branch, and then presented to
the President for his approval.305 However, it is equally important to state that the
pathway to the solution should not reflexively rely on the special needs cases,
which are based on programmatic purposes that extend beyond the normal needs of
law enforcement.306 Rather, the solution relies on the principle that consequence
has a constitutional role to play in Fourth Amendment calculus in certain limited
circumstances.307
As discussed above, the path forward also requires the executive branch to
submit specific minimization procedures to the judicial branch for approval.
Approval by the judicial branch of procedures that particularize the specific
communications that may be retained by the executive branch would be an
effective privacy-enhancing mechanism to ensure that “nothing is left to the
discretion of the officer executing the warrant,”308 a core Fourth Amendment
principle. Whether additional restrictions are also appropriate, including restrictions
on the government’s ability to use the fruits of the wiretap, is another critical
question that needs to be answered by policymakers.309 This is particularly

301. Fiss, supra note 27, at 29. Fiss would, however, “resist the temptation to allow an
exception to the warrant requirement for so-called extraordinary crimes, regardless of how
the exception is formulated.” Id. In addition to being concerned about the difficulty of
identifying the criteria needed to implement any exception, Fiss “fear[s] that an exception to
the warrant requirement for extraordinary crimes would be susceptible to great abuse.” Id.
302. See ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 733 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also
Henry Schuster, Inside America’s Secret Court, CNN (Feb. 14, 2006, 6:41 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/02/13/schuster.column/ (quoting the Honorable Royce C.
Lamberth, former Chief Judge of the FISA court, saying that “the court was not a
rubberstamp for the government”).
303. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 320 (“We cannot accept the Government’s argument that
internal security matters are too subtle and complex for judicial evaluation.”); see also
KRIS & WILSON, supra note 164, § 3:6.
304. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
305. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President
of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it . . . .”).
306. See supra notes 85–93 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 104–52 and accompanying text.
308. E.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
309. See generally Ricardo J. Bascuas, Fourth Amendment Lessons from the Highway
and the Subway: A Principled Approach to Suspicionless Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 719,
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important because use restrictions with respect to serious criminal activity could
very well deprive the government of evidence that could convict a murderer.310 On
the other hand, determining the nature and extent of use restrictions may, in certain
circumstances, be critical to a court’s conclusion that the government’s actions
should be considered constitutionally reasonable.
Congressional action that establishes clear definitions and sets meaningful
standards would ensure that if the government’s actions were subsequently
presented to the judicial branch for review, presidential authority would be “at its
maximum,” rather than in a “zone of twilight” or “at its lowest ebb.”311 Inclusion of
the legislative branch should also be viewed as an important constitutional value to
be preserved by a nation founded on a system of checks and balances.312 Finally,
the legislative branch must ensure that inflexible constraints are not placed on the
executive branch, which would prevent it from responding to the often
unpredictable nature of a terrorist threat.313
The challenge for the legislative branch is, therefore, to create a flexible process
that still maintains an important independent check by the judicial branch.314 As the
Supreme Court has observed in another constitutional context, Congress should
engage in a “genuine debate about how best to preserve constitutional values while
protecting the Nation from terrorism.”315 Moreover, as Justice Jackson wisely
781 (2007) (arguing that suspicionless searches could be justified under certain
circumstances if “anything seized unrelated to the danger . . . [is] suppressed”); Covey, supra
note 286, at 1318 (arguing that we must find ways “to shift the focus of Fourth Amendment
law from regulation of the acquisition of information to regulation of its use”); Simmons,
supra note 13, at 915 (arguing “suspicionless searches could be permitted as long as the
government is not permitted to use any fruits of the search in a subsequent prosecution”).
310. Cf. United States v. Isa, 923 F.2d 1300, 1304 (8th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the
suppression of evidence obtained from a FISA wiretap that targeted a suspected foreign
agent who had allegedly murdered his daughter).
311. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635–38
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Cf. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297,
303–07 (1972) (finding that the 1968 version of Title III was “essentially neutral” and
“nebulous,” and that Congress “left presidential powers where it found them”).
312. See generally JOHN ADAMS, THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT (1776), reprinted in 4 THE
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A LIFE OF THE
AUTHOR, NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 198 (Charles C. Little & James Brown eds., 1851)
(“[T]he judicial power ought to be distinct from both the legislative and executive, and
independent upon both, . . . as both should be checks upon that.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at
72–73 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[Checks and balances] are
means, and powerful means, by which the excellencies of republican government may be
retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 303 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“When the legislative and executive powers are
united in the same person . . . there can be no liberty. . . .”) (quoting BARON DE
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151 (Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner Publishing 1949)).
313. See supra note 160 and accompanying text; see also Keith, 407 U.S. at 312 (“[U]nless
Government safeguards its own capacity to function and to preserve the security of its people,
society itself could become so disordered that all rights and liberties would be endangered.”).
314. Keith, 407 U.S. at 317.
315. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008) (Souter, J., concurring) (“The
political branches, consistent with their independent obligations to interpret and uphold the
Constitution, can engage in a genuine debate about how best to preserve constitutional
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stated in his concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure case, “We may say that power
to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress
itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers.”316
CONCLUSION
The prevention of massive destruction or catastrophic loss of life should be
viewed as a critical factor in assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness. In the
context of the hypothetical, it is simply unacceptable to conclude that there are no
circumstances where a federal court could issue a wiretap order that would enable
the government to locate a terrorist and prevent the use of a WMD. As other
scholars have noted, “[T]raditional [Fourth Amendment] doctrine falls short in an
age of threats unprecedented in their potential for harm.”317 However, the Fourth
Amendment’s protective lens and the probability consequence matrix can provide a
pathway toward a new doctrinal solution. While the matrix will not resolve all of
the issues that are raised by the hypothetical, and while subjective judgments may
be inherent when assessments of probability and consequence are made, the matrix
can provide an analytical framework for assessing the role that consequence should
play in a Fourth Amendment calculus.
Fairly well-established minimization principles are an essential element of a
new doctrinal solution to the hypothetical. Such a solution, however, will require
members of the legislative branch—as the elected representatives of the people—to
debate the issues fully and assert their constitutional role in determining what is
reasonable when a terrorist threatens to use a WMD. The legislative branch must
enact clear definitions and standards “calibrated to the risk”318 that prevent the
executive branch from unnecessarily intruding upon individual privacy.319 In
addition, by requiring the executive branch to submit narrowly tailored
minimization procedures, the executive branch’s actions will be cabined by the
specific exigency which justified the surveillance.320 Most importantly, the
imposition of such procedures will ensure that the executive branch will be acting
under the watchful eye of the judicial branch.321 Taken together, all of these actions
will provide government officials with greater ex ante legal certainty in regard to
the constitutionality of their preventative actions, as well as the flexibility they may

values while protecting the Nation from terrorism.” (emphasis added)).
316. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring).
317. Gould & Stern, supra note 24, at 777; see also Stuntz, supra note 24, at 849
(“Different crimes give rise to different government interests, which in turn should lead to
different Fourth Amendment standards.”).
318. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (“[W]here the risk to public safety is
substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as
‘reasonable. . . .’”).
319. Keith, 407 U.S. at 317.
320. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1968).
321. See generally Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978) (commenting
on the interest of citizens in inspecting judicial records and documents in order to keep a
“watchful eye on the workings of public agencies”).
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need to respond to dynamic and unpredictable circumstances. Thus, government
lawyers will say yes when they should say yes, and no when they should say no.322
Stated another way, and to paraphrase former Supreme Court Justice Potter
Stewart’s observation about automobile searches, thoughtful and deliberative action
by each branch of government is necessary lest the acronym WMD becomes a
“talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears.”323
The nation should not have to make the “false choice”324 between security and
liberty. Instead, all three branches should play a role325 in ensuring the enduring
vitality of the Fourth Amendment in this “brave new world”326 where the terrorist
use of a WMD could lead to massive destruction or catastrophic loss of life.

322. See Baker, supra note 161. Judge James E. Baker cautions, however, that the reality
of many legal questions related to national security law is that they are not yes or no
questions. JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR
PERILOUS TIMES 317 (2007). Thus, if the policy choices discussed in this Article can be
“embedded in law,” then the law will be a “source of calm and stability” at a time when
lawyers are under stress and must apply the law to uncertain or emerging facts. Id. at 309,
313; see also James E. Baker, Process, Practice, and Principle: Teaching National Security
Law and the Knowledge That Matters Most, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 163, 178 (2014) (“[I]t
is the nature of national security practice to confront novel questions under great pressure
where lives are at stake.”).
323. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461–62 (1971).
324. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 395 (2004).
325. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (asserting that the constitution
“envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake”).
326. See Covey, supra note 286, at 1318.

